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comments on earlier drafts.The  Political  Economy  of Inflation  and  Stabilization
in  Middle-Income  Countries
Stephan  Haggard  and  Robert  Kaufman
In a  number  of  middle-income  developing  countries,  the  severe
inflationary  crises  of the  1980s  coincided  with  political  liberalization  and
an expansion  of the  arena  of distributive  politics. This  wave of
democratization  raises  questions  that  have recurred  throughout  the  post-World
War II  period. To  what extent  do distributive  conflicts  among  contending
social  groups  aggravate  macroeconomic  imbalances?  How  are  these  political
pressures  affected  by the  party  system,  the  nature  of representative
institutions  and the  type  of  political  regime? Are authoritarian  regimes
"necessary"  for  bringing  inflation  under  control  in  countries  where  the  level
of political  mobilization  and  social  conflict  is  high?
This  paper  provides  a comparative  analysis  of the  politics  of inflation
and stabilization  in seventeen  Latin  American  and  Asian  countries.  Although
we are interested  in the  effects  of  distributive  conflicts  generally,  we pay
particular  attention  to social  movements  and  governments  that  seek  to  mobilize
the  popular  sector,  usually  in  opposition  to the  existing  distribution  of
income  and  assets. Macroeconomic  instability  may also  result  from
distributive  conflicts  among  other  regional,  sectoral  or ethnic  groups.
However,  both  before  and  during  the  1980s,  populist  policy  cycles  have raised
the  troubling  question  of the  relationship  between  populism,  inflation,  and
the  viability  of democratic  inst..tutions. 1
Section  one  of the  paper  reviews  the  arguments  linking  political
constraints  to  macroeconomic  policy  and  inflation,  with  particular  attention
1to the  role  that  populism  might  play  in propagating  inflation.  In Section  Two,
we examine  the  inflation  histories  of three  groups  of  middle-income  countries:
those  that  have  maintained  relatively  stable  macroeconomic  policies  over  the
long-run;  those  that  have periodically  experienced  severe  difficulties,  but
managed  to  adjust;  and  those  that  experienced  recurrent  cycles  of very  high
inflation  over  an  extended  period.  In Section  Thzee,  we draw  more extensively
on case  studies  of particular  inflation  episodes  to examine  the  conditions
under  which  inflation  has been  brought  down,  paying  particular  attention  to
the  effect  of regime  type  on stabilization  efforts.
Three  broad  findings  are  worth  underlining  at the  outset. First,
although  distributive  pressures  centering  on populist  demands  have  played  an
important  role  in  most cases  of very  high  inflation,  populism  was not  a
cignificant  factor  in the  majority  of the  inflationary  episodes  in  our  sample.
Many countries  in  which  popular  sector  groups  were  weak or repressed  have  also
experienced  difficulties  with inflation  as a result  of  external  shocks,  policy
miscalculations,  elections,  and  distributive  pressures  from  the  middle  class,
bureaucracy,  military,  business,  and  state-owned  enterprises.  Even  where
organized  labor  and  other  popular-sector  groups  ha:e been  participants  in
conflicts  that  have  inflationary  consequences,  their  goals  have  usually  been
defensive  in  nature,  responding  to periods  of  wage compression  or the  erosion
of real  wages  that  comes  from  inflation  itself. It is  also important  to
emphasize  that  the  populist  policies  responsible  for  inflationary  cycles  stem
as  much from  the  strategies  of contending  political  elites  as they  do from  the
independent  capacity  of popular-sector  groups  to defend  their  incomes  through
collective  action.
2A second  and related  point  concerns  the  importance  of institutions  for
understanding  the  politics  of inflation  and stabilization.  Although  the  size
and  organizational  capacity  of popular-sector  groups  does  have  an effect  on
the  ability  of governments  to  maintain  stable  macroeconomic  policies,  much
depends  on the  way the  party  system  channels  group  demands.  Macroeconomic
stability  is  most  precarious  where  the  party  system  is fragmented  or
polarized,  thereby  reinforcing  social  and  economic  cleavages  among  contending
groups.  Where  partisan  conflict  is  proscribed  or  where  a single  party
dominates,  governments  can  coopt  important  groups  into  corporatist  or party
structures  that  facilitate  bargaining,  engthen  time  horizons,  or simply  limit
the  range  of group  demands. In such olitical  settings,  technocrats  are  also
most likely  to  be insulated  from  the  pull  of  distributive  political  conflicts,
and  have greater  independence  in formulating  policy. More competitive
constitutional  systems  can  also  sustain  macroeconomic  stability,  but  this  is
more likely  where  broad,  catch-all  parties  mute social  conflict  and  prevent
the  abrupt  shifts  in  policy  that  are  likely  in  more  polarized  or fragmented
settings.
A third  finding  concerns  the  long-standing  debate  on the  capacity  of
different  political  regimes  to restore  price  stability  once  inflation  has
accelerated.  Where  rates  of inflation  are low  or  moderate,  constitutional  and
authoritarian  regimes  seem  equally  able  to implement  stabilization  policies.
On the  other  hand,  virtually  all  very  high  inflations  in  our  sample  have  only
been  brought  down  under  the  auspices  of labor-repressive  authoritarian
regimes,  even  where  wage pressures  were  not  necessarily  a significant  cause  of
inflationary  pressure.  This  pattern  suggests  that  regime  type  can  have an
important  influence  on stabilization  outcomes  in some  political  and  economic
3settings,  and  underscores  the  particular  difficulties  new iemocracies  face  in
controlling  the  rampant  inflations  that  plague  a number  of  Latin  Americar.
countries.
Before  beginning  our  analysis,  two  objections  might  be raised  to the
particular  emphasis  we place  on the  domestic  political  sources  of inflation.
It  could  be argued  that  domestic  political  conflict  is less  important  for
understanding  inflation  and  stabilization  than  external  shocks  or
international  conflicts  over  the  adjustment  process.  As will  be seen,  external
shocks  figure  prominently  in  the  following  story,  thougn  countries'
vulnerability  to them  and  ability  to  adjust  are  closely  related  to domestic
policy  and  politics.  We also recognize  that  the  IMF  and  creditors  initially
responded  to the  debt  crisis  by emphasizing  demand  management  at the  expense
of structural  adjustment  and  debt  relief,  but  these  issues  are  treated
elsewhere.
Second,  it  can  be argued  that  orthodox  stabilization  measures  may  be
inappropriate  for  managing  very  high inflations  where  strong  inertial  forces
are  at  work.  It is also  wrong  to portray  stabilization  as an end  in itself.
Macroeconomic  management  is  ultimately  a tool  for  achieving  growth  objectives,
and it  may b3 acceptable  to  tolerate  some  inflation  if the  costs  of
stabilization  in terms  of output  are  high.  Resistance  to stabilization  may
thus  stem  not only  from  the  play  of political  interests,  but from  substantive
disagreements  over  development  strategy,  tradeoffs  among  different  economic
objectives,  and  the  efficacy  of orthodox  policy  prescriptions.  2
Despite  these  caveats,  it  is  clear  that  high inflation  has  proved
extremely  costly  and that  coherent  demand  management  policies  are  a  necessary
pre-requisite  for  sustainable  economic  growth. Even  where some  form  of
4,heterodox"  measures  are  called  for,  they  are  unlikely  to  work in  the  absence
of complementary  orthodox'  measures.  There  is  also increasing  agreement  that
longer-term  measures  of structural  adjustment  will  not  be effective  unless
inflation  is first  brought  under  control.  It should  be clear  that  politics
influences  macroeconomic  choice;  exactly  how  is the  subject  to  which  we now
turn.
I.  Theories,  Bypotheses,  Variables
We are  interested  in  two  sets  of outcomes,  the  first  being  differences
in the level  and  variability  of inflation  over  the  long-run. Why  do some
developing  countries  have  high inflation  while  others  maintain  relative  price
stability? And  why  do countries  with high  mean inflation  rates  also  appear  to
exhibit  cycles  of stop-go  macroeconomic  policy,  cycles  that  may  be more
damaging  for  economic  activity  and  political  stability  than  high levels  of
inflation  per  se? 3 Our  main  concern,  however,  is in  tb-  political  economy  of
stabilization:  how  political  factors  affect  the  timing  ot the  introduction  of
stabilization  packages;  the  mix  of instruments  used,  including  the  balance
between  "orthodox"  and "heterodoxw  measures;  and  the  ability  to sustain
stabilization  objectives  in the  face  of  political  resistance.
We begin  by analyzing  the  way distributive  conflicts,  particularly  those
involving  the  popular  sector,  translate  into  inflation.  Defining  the 'popular
sector'  poses  particular  difficulties,  since  it  has  been  identified  in  part  by
class  position,  in  part  by employment  in  the  import-substituting  and  non-
traded  goods  sectors,  in  part  by the  urban-rural  divide. Moreover,  populism
as a  political  movement  encompasses  groups  that  can  have  sharply  conflicting
interests:  the  urban  poor,  public  employees,  unionized  industrial  workers,  and
at times,  the  small  manufacturing  and  service  establishments  that  make  up the
5'petite  bourgeoisie."  We will  therefore  focus  on two  distinct,  but related,
political  forces. The  first  are  political  leaders,  parties,  or  movements  that
seek  the  support  of the  popular  sector  on the  basis  of  distributive  appeals
directed  against  high-income  groups. We  will also  pay  attention  to industrial
and  public  sector  unions,  since  they  usually  form  the  core  of  movements
demanding  redistributions  of income.
As Albert  Hirschman  has  pointed  out  drily,  "the  explanation  of inflation
in terms  of social  conflict  between  groups,  each  aspiring  to  a greater  share
of the  social  product,  has  become  the  sociologist's  monotonous  equivalent  of
the  economist's  untiring  stress  on  the  undue  expansion  of the  money  supply." 4
Before  turning  to the  political  constraints  on  policy,  we must therefore
provide  some  account  of the  economic  mechanisms  through  which  group  conflicts
might  be translated  into  inflation.
One  source  of inflationary  pressure  is  cost-push.  Where  unions  and
popular  sector  groitps  are  strong,  whether  because  of government  support  or
level  of organizatior.,  wage settlements  are  likely  to be  more  generous  than  in
those  countries  where  such  groups  are  organizationally  weak;  this  mechanism
has  been  a central  concern  of  much  of the  literature  on the  political  economy
of inflation  in the  advanced  industrial  states.5 When  firms  are  able  to  pass
along  rising  labor  costs  through  higher  prices,  cumulative  inflationary  cycles
can result.6
The  second  source  of inflationary  pressure,  and the  one  on  which  we
focus  our  attention,  is through  fiscal  policy.  The  inflationary  impact  of a
given  fiscal  stance  will depend  on the  share  of  bu get  deficits  that  are
financed  by money  creation,  the  size  of the  monetary  base,  and  the  demand  for
money.  Nonetheless,  a growing  literatuid  has documented  that  budget  deficits
6financed  by seignorage  have  played  a crucial  role  in  developing  country
inflation.7
The  task  for  political  economy  is  to specify  tht  political  correlates  of
inflationary  fiscal  policy. One  approach  is  to focus  directly  on the  presence
and  strength  of  what  Mancur  Olson  has  called  wdistributive  coalitions.6 8 The
extent  of urbanization  and  industrialization  has  historically  been  higher  in
the  more developed  Latin  American  countries  and  Turkey  than  it  has  been  until
very recently  in the  other  Asian  cases,  and  this  might  be a plausible
indicator  of the  likely  presence  of  popular  sector  groups.  (TaMle  1)
Inflation  rates  from  1960  through  1980  correlate  fairly  strongly  with
urbanization  in  1960 (.61)  and  with industry's  share  of GDP  in 1960 (.56).
The  data  on labor  organization  and  income  distribution  is  much  less  reliable.
Available  estimates  suggest  more extensive  unionization  in  Latin  America  than
in  East  Asia,  though  the  simple  correlation  between  unionization  and inflation
from  1960-1980  for  this  sample  of countries  is  weak (.17).  Income  distribution
is,  in  general,  also  much  more skewed  in  Latin  America  as  well.  This should  be
a good  predictor  of the  presence  of popular  sector  groups  and  populist
politics,  though  clearly  not  of their  s,;_cess. 9
7Table 1
Social and Economic btructure and Inflation
in East Asia and Latin America
Urban  Share of Labor
Population/ Industryl  Force in  Income:  Average Annual
Total  GDP (1960)  Unions  Lowest Fifth/  Inflation
(1960)  (c.  1975)  Highest Fifth 1965-  1980-
1980  1986
Argentina  71?  38Z  25Z  11.4  78.32  326.2?
Brazil  45  35  na  33.3  31.3  157.1
Chile  69  38  25  11.4  129.9  20.2
Colombia  47  26  13  21.1  17.4  22.6
Costa Rica  34  19  12  16.6  11.3  32.3
Jamaica  30  38  25  na  12.8  19.8
Mexico  50  29  20  15.1  13.1  63.7
Peru  47  29  37  32.1  20.5  100.1
Uruguay  73  28  25  10.8  57.8  5C.4
Venezuela  68  22  45  18.0  8.7  8.7
Mean, Latin
America  53.4  30.2  25.2  18.9  38.1  80.1
Indonesia  15  17  10  na  34.3  8.9
Korea  28  19  10  7.5  18.8  5.4
Malaysia  26  18  15  16.0  4.9  1.4
Philippines  30  28  na  13.6  11.7  18.2
Taiwan  35  29  11  4.2  8.3  5.8
Thailand  13  19  na  8.9  6.8  3.0
Turkey  30  21  8  na  20.7  37.3
Mean, Asia  25.3  21.6  10.8  10.0  15.1  11.4
(Note:  means are unweighted averages. Data on income distribution is from
household surveys in the late 1960s or early 1970s.  Industry share of GDP is
probably biased upwards for the Latin AmL  can countries because of higher
levels of protection.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1978 (Washington  D.C.: World
Bank, 1978); World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1988 (New  York: Oxford
University Press, 1988); Republic of China, Council on Economic Planning and
Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1988 (Taipei:  CEPD, 1988); Charles
Lewis Taylor and David Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators (New  Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); Jeffrey Sachs, 'Social
Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America,w National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 2897 (March 1989).
8There  are  some  striking  anomalies  raised  by this  approach,  however,
particularly  with regard  to  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  inflation.
Countries  such  as Chile,  Argentina,  and  Uruguay,  with long  histories  of  both
populism  and inflation,  do not  have  highly  unequal  distributions  of income,  at
least  by regional  standards.  Conversely,  income  is relatively  concentrated  in
Malaysia,  Venezuela  and  Colombia,  countries  with long  histories  of low
inflation. For  this  sample,  the  simple  correlation  between  inequality  and
inflation,  1960-80,  is actually  negative  (-.23).
Part  of the  problem  lies  in  the  proxies  for  measuring  the "strength*  of
distributional  coalitions.  A large  industrial  workforce  can  be weakly
organized,  as those  in Korea  and  Taiwan  have  been  until  quite  recently.
Conversely,  urban  forces,  including  civil  servants,  may play  a  political  role
disproportionate  to  their  actual  numbers;  this  is the  case in  a number  of low
income  African  countries.  More importantly,  this  met1od  necessarily  obscures
the  actual  political  procesfas  that  yield  the  inflationary  outcome. Is an
expansionary  fiscal  policy  the  unintended  consequence  of increased  pressures
for  transfers,  subsidies,  and  government  pat..onage,  the  conscious  result  of
efforts  by politicians  to expand  output  in response  to  various  political
constraints,  or the  effect  of  misguided  economic  strategy? 10
Rather  than  this  approach,  we focus  directly  on the  mechanisms  through
which  politics  influences  macroeconomic  policy  choice.  There  are  at least
three  approaches  to  this  question:  one  emphasizes  electoral  constraints,
insecurities  of tenure,  and  political  instability;  one  the  constituent  bases
of governments;  and  one  the  institutional  context  of decision-making.
Strategic  models  of elections  focus  on the  time-horizons  of politicians,
9and  assume  some  ability  to engineer  a trade-off  between  inflation  and
output. 11 In  the  pre-election  period,  incumbent  governments  will  be sensitive
to unemployment,  particularly  if  popular  sector  groups  are  politically
mobilized  or simultaneously  engaged  in  demonstrations  or protests. This
sensitivity  is  not  necessarily  limited  to  democratic  governments;  it  may  be
equally  acute  in  milit&ry  regimes  seeking  to  engineer  a transition  to
democracy.  Inflationary  macroeconomic  policy  may thus  be a product  of regime
changes,  as  well as institutionalized  electorul  cycles. 12
Though  this  strategic  view  of  macroeconomic  policy  has  been  used  to
explain  recurrent  cycles  of  ot'tput  and  prices,  it  can  be expanded  to explain
cross-national  differences  in inflation  over  the  long  run.  Political  systems
in  which  there  are frequent  elections  and  changes  of government  cr ongoing
challenges  to the  security  of officeholders  are  likely  to  be ones  in  which  the
time  horizons  of politicians  are  chronically  short.  Such  political  instability
can  provide  recurrent  incentives  to Lnflate,  overvalue  the  currency  and
borrow,  resulting  in  an inflation  path that  is  higher  than  that  which  would
occur  under  a  more stable  political  setting. 13
A second  strand  of  analysis  focuses  on the  orientation  of the  government
in  power.  We would  expect  differences  in  the  policy  preferences  of  parties  and
governments  to reflect  different  constituent  bases. 14 The  range  of political
orientations  in the  developing  world  is somewhat  wider  than  in the  advanced
industrial  states  however,  with greater  representation  at the  extremes. We
have therefore  divided  governments  into  four  groups  based  on an assessment  of
their  programmatic  statements  and  political  appeals At one  extreme  are
rightist  governments  that  are  explicitly  anti-labor,  anti-populist  and  anti-
leftist  (coded  '1'). This  category  includes,  but  is  not limited  to,  right-
10wing authoritarian  regimes. These  governments  seek  to defend  the
concentration  of income  and  assets  among  business  elites,  large  landowners,
and  upper  middle-class  groups,  and  can  be expected  to  pursue  the  most
conservative  macroeconomic  policy.  Our  second  category  (coded  "2')  corresponds
closely  to the  center-right  category  among  the  advanced  industrial  states.
Our  third  category  (coded  "3")  are  moderately  reformist  governments  of the
center-left,  typified  by the  reformist  Latin  American  governments  of the  1960s
that  were favored  by the  Alliance  for  Progress. The final  category  (coded
"4")  consists  of governments  that  are  committed  to  a redistribution  of income
and  assets  toward  the  popular  sector,  and  can  be expected  to  have the  most
expansionist  macroeconomic  policies.  We will  call  these  governments
'populist,"  though  the  category  includes  socialist  experiments,  such  as the
Allende  period  in  Chile  and  the  Manley  governments  in  Jamaica  as  well.
While  we expect  the  distributive  orientation  of the  government  to  play
an important  role  in  determining  the  content  of  policy,  we also  want  to
explore  the  independent  effect  of institutional  arrangements  on  macroeconomic
policy.  There  are  a  number  of institutional  variables  which  may  be of
significance,  including  the  independence  of the  central  bank  and  the  mechanics
of the  budgetary  process. 15 We focus  here,  however,  on the  party  system  and
the  way in  which  it structures  the  representation  of interests  and  patterns  of
group  conflict.
We expect  that  the  formulation  of  macroeconomic  policy  is likely  to be
most  difficult  in electoral  systems  in  which  party  alignments  are  polarized  or
fragmented  (coded  '3'). Political  polarization  refers  to the  bifurcation  of
the  party  system  into  two  competing  blocs  which  define  their  interests  in
zero-sum  terms.  In  middle-income  countries,  such  polarization  is  frequently
11associated  with the  political  mobilization  of the  urban  popular  sector.
Fragmentation  refers  to a  party  system  in  which  more than  two  major  parties
compete,  usually  as a result  of electoral  rules  that  encourage  party
formation,  particularly  proportional  representation.  Such rules  provide
incentives  for  the  organization  of ideologically-oriented  parties,  including
those  making  appeals  to  the  popular  sector,  though  fragmentation  does  not
guarantee  their  influence.
Systems  dominated  by catch-all  parties  that  cut  broadly  across  sectoral
and  class  lines  provide  less  scope  for  populist  politics,  and  appear  conducive
to stable  policy  outcomes.  (These  systems  are  coded  "2") Since  unions  and
other  popular  sector  groups  must operate  within  cross-class  organizations,
their  influence  is  necessarily  reduced.  Such  electoral  systems  would  include
dominant  party  systems  such  as  Malaysia  and  Mexico  as  well as
institutionalized  two-party  systems  such  Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  Uruguay
prior  to the  military's  entry  into  politics.
Finally,  interest  group  influence  is likely  to  be weakest  in  no-party  or
one-party  systems.  We call these  systems  wmonist,"  and  have  coded  them  as "1."
Again,  the reasons  for  this  expectation  are  empirical  as  much  as theoretical,
and  may simply  reflect  the  absence  of revolutionary  governments  in our  sample.
Where  political  competition  has  been  restricted  in  middle-income  countries,
however,  it is frequently  to limit  the  influence  of the  popular  sector.  The
reasoning  is  also  broader;  no-party  or dominant  party  systems  will provide
less  political  space  for  interest  groups,  including  the  popular  sector,  to
organize  or gain  effective  representation,  and  greater  autonomy  for
technocratic  elites.
12The  distinction  between  monist  systems  and  others  is  not  wholly
equivalent  to the  distinction  between  authoritarian  and  democratic  regimes.  In
some  authoritarian  system,  the  government  has  been  unable  or  unwilling  to
suppress  party  activity,  even  if the  rules  of the  political  game  do not  allow
leaders  to be chosen  in  competitive  elections.  A number  of authoritarian
regimes  have undergone  periods  of  political  polarization  or fragmentation,  as
opposition  forces  have  coalesced  against  the  government's  wishes  or have  been
allowed  to  operate  under  some  constraint  during  a  period  of transition  to
fully  democratic  rule.
Institutional  arrangements  might  affect  macroeconomic  policy  through
several  distinct  mechanisms.  Fragmented  and  polarized  systems  are likely  to  be
associated  with frequent  changes  of government,  and it  may thus  be the
instability  of the  system  that  yields  suboptimal  performance.  Polarized  and
fragmented  systems  are  also  ones  in  which  the  policy  preferences  of contending
parties  diverge  sharply.  Where  centrist  political  forces  are  weak,  the  zone  of
compromise  between  contending  groups  shrinks  and  alternations  of government
will be associated  with  wider  swings  in  basic  policy  orientation.  This
conflict  between  groups  with different  inflation  preferences  might  explain
high  variability  in inflation  in  particular. 16
In fragmented  party  systems,  inflation  may be the (unintended)  result  of
coalition  politics,  and  the  need  to payoff  coalition  partners. Where  small
parties  hold  the  electoral  balance,  they  can  gain  a  veto  over spending  and
taxing  decisions. Similarly,  it  could  be argued  that  governments  in  highly
polarized  or fragmented  settings  will seek  to  accommodate  competing  pressurer
in  order  to  mute conflict.  One  way of  doing  this  in  the  short-run  is  through
expansionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policies. In the  case  studies  that  follow,
13we attempt  to identify  clearly  the  mechanisms  through  which  institutional
structures  actually  influence  macroeconomic  policy  choice.
II.  Political  Sources  of Inflation  over  the  Long-run
We turn  now to the  politics  of inflation  in the  middle-income  countries.
Table  2 provides  two  ways  of assessing  inflation  histories.  Mean  annual
inflation  rates  provide  a picture  of  cross-national  differences  over  the  long
run.  To obtain  a  better  picture  of the  variability  of inflation  over  time,  and
to isolate  the  way  political  factors  contribute  to inflation,  we have  also
identified  various  inflation  'episodes"  when inflation  peaked  over  a specific
threshold  for  a full  calendar  year.  Peaks  between  15  and  29 percent  are
considered  episodes  of 'moderate'  inflation,  those  between  30 and  89  percent
are  considered  'high,'  and  those  over  90  percent  "very  high." 17 These
episodes  also  provide  the  basis  for  identifying  stabilization  efforts,  the
subject  of the  following  section.  In this  section,  however,  we focus  on the
political  correlates  of inflation  over  the  long-run,  using  tne  country  rather
than  the  episode  as the  unit  of analysis.
Both  the  mean annual  inflation  rates  since  1960  and  the  incidence  of
inflation  episodes,  suggest  three  broad  national  inflation  histories.  (Table
2)  One  group  of countries  has  maintained  low  inflation  for  most  of the  last
three  decades. These  countries  experienced  inflationary  pressures  at  various
points  in  their  histories,  but  usually  as the  result  of external  shocks  rather
than  domestic  politics  and  policies.  We include  in  this  group  Malaysia,
Thailand,  Taiwan,  and  Venezuela. At the  other  extreme  are  a group  of very
high inflation  countries  that  experienced  recurrent  and  severe  cycles  of
inflation  over  extended  periods:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay  and  Chile  before
the  mid-1970s. The  remainder  of the  countries  have  mixed  records;  Jamaica,
14Turkey,  Peru,  Indonesia,  Korea,  the  Philippines,  Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Costa
Rica fall  into  this  category. These  countries  have either  had  recurrent
cycles  of  moderate  inflation  or relatively  severe  inflations  that  were
internally  generated,  but  confined  to short  periods  of time.  We also  include
in  this  group  countries  such  as  Mexico  and  Peru  which  had long  histories  of
low  inflation,  but  have recently  experienced  serious  and  sustained
inflationary  pressures. We organize  the  discussion  of the  political
correlates  of?  inflation  around  these  three  distinct  patterns.
15Table  2
Cross-National  Patterns  of Inflation
Mean Annual Inflation  Inflation Episodes




1ow Inflation  Countries
Malaysia  4.9  1.4  1974 (16.1)
Taiwan  8.3  5.8  1960  (18.4);  1974 (47.5);  1980 (19.0)
Thailand  6.8  3.0  1974 (24.3); 1980 (19.7)
Venezuela  8.7  8.7  1980  (21.5);  1987 (28.1)
2. Countries  with  Mixed  Records
Colombia  17.4  22.6  1963 (32.0); 1966 (19.1);  1977 (33.1)
1985 (24.0)
Costa Rica  11.3  32.3  1974 (30.1); 1982 (90.1)
Jamaica  12.8  19.8  1974 (27.2);  1978 (34.9); 1984 (27.8)
Mexico  13.1  63.7  1977 (29.0);  1987 (131.8)
Peru  20.5  100.1  1968 (19.0);  1975 (23.6);  1981 (75.4)
1985 (163.4)
Indonesia  34.3  8.9  1966 (1044.8); 1973 (40.6);  1978 (18.2)
Korea  18.8  5.4  1964 (29.5); 1970 (16.1);  1975 (25.3);
1980 (28.7)
Philippines  11.7  18.2  1971 (21.4); 1974 (34.2);  1980 (18.2);
1984 (50.3)
Turkey  20.7  37.3  1975 (19.2);  1980 (110.2)
3. High Inflation Countries
Argentina  78.3  326.2  1952 (38.1); 1959 (113.9);  1966 (31.7);
1971 (61.2); 1976 (443.2);
1985 (672.1);  1987 (229.7)
Brazil  31.3  157.1  1956 (21.8); 1959 (51.9); 1964 (91.4)
1979 (52.7); 1987 (227.1)
Chile  129.9  20.2  1955 (84.0): 1959 (33.3);  1963 (45.3);
1970 (34 9); 1974 (504.7)
Uruguay  57.8  50.4  1959 (39.5); 1968 (125.3); 1973 (97.0);
1986 (76.4)
Note:  Inflation is measured by change in the consumer price index.  Inflation
,episodes'  are  periods  when the  inflation  rate  crosses  one  of three
thresholds: 'moderate,  inflations  exceed  15 percent  for  a calendar  year,
'high'  inflations  exceed  30 percent,  and "very  high'  inflations  90  percent.  In
the  discussion,  an 'episode'  includes  all  those  years  when the  rate  of
inflation increased  without interruption, based on the highest annual
inflation  rate  reached;  this  peak  inflation  rate  is reported  here in
parentheses.
16Low  Inflation  Countries
Countries  with extended  records  of price  stability  provide  a useful
comparative  backdrop  for  understanding  those  cases  in  which  more serious
inflationary  pressures  emerge. Malaysia,  Thailand,  Taiwan,  and  Venezuela  have
all  maintained  annual  average  inflation  rates  of less  than  10  percent  since
1960.  These  countries  have  not  been  immune  from  periods  of accelerating
inflation:  Malaysia  in 1974;  Thailand  in  1973-4  and  1980;  Venezuela  in  1979-80
and 1987;  and  Taiwan  in  1960,  1973  and  1980. With  the  exception  of the
episode  in  1960  in  Taiwan,  which  was the  result  of increased  government
spending  in connection  with the  Taiwan  Straits  crisis,  and  Venezuela's
difficulties  in the  1980s,  these  inflations  were largely  the  result  of
external  shocks,  however,  and  cannot  be attributed  in  any  significant  way to
government  policy.
The  range  of countries  that  fall  into  this  category  suggests  that  it is
possible  to sustain  price  stability  within  the  context  of different  economic
structures  and  development  strategies.  The  low-inflation  Asian  economies  are
more open  than  their  Latin  American  counterparts.  This  may  have  an important
effect  on macroeconomic  policies,  since  relative  openness  creates  export
interests  that  are sensitive  to relative  price  changes,  though  the  contrast
between  Taiwan  and  Korea  suggests  interesting  differences  among  the  export-
oriented  East  Asian  NICs. On the  other  hand,  though  Venezuela  is an oil
exporter,  it resembles  the  other  Latin  American  countries  in terms  of its
industrial  strategy. It has  a large  state-owned  enterprise  sector  devoted  to
secondary  import-substitution  in intermediate  and  capital  goods  and  high
levels  of protection.
17The  political  systems  of the  low-inflation  countries  also  appear  to  be
quite  diverse.  Venezuela  is a two-party  democracy.  Malaysia  has  been
democratic  since  independence,  with  the  exception  of a  brief  interlude  of
emergency  rule.  It  has  been  governed  continuously  by a ruling  coalition  that
integrates  conservative  parties  from  the  three  ethnic  communities,  but in
which  the  dominant  Malay  party  is  primus  inter  pares.  Until  the  mid-1970s,
Thailand  had  a long  history  of  military  rule. A brief  liberalization  in 1973-
74  was reversed  by a  military  coup,  but since  1978,  the  country  has  been
engaged  in  a controlled  process  of  political  liberalization  and
democratization.  Taiwan  has  had  continuous  single-party  rule  since  1945  under
the  Kuomintang,  but  began  a far-reaching  political  liberalization  in  the  mid-
1980s.
Notwithstanding  these  apparent  differences,  these  political  systems
exhibit  certain  commonalities.  First,  all  possessed  party  structures  or other
institutional  arrangements  that  limited  the  organizational  and  coalitional
possibilities  of  popular  sector  groups,  thus  insulating  politicians  from
distributive  claims  "from  below." Second,  these  institutions  exhibited
continuity  over  a substantial  period  of time.  Finally,  and in  part  because  of
the  level  of insulation  and stability,  politicians  were  willing  to delegate
authority  to key  technocratic  decision-makers  who  enjoyed  organizational
autonomy  and  a  high degree  of credibility.
Taiwan  and  Thailand  achieved  stable  macroeconomic  policy  under
authoritarian  auspices. Taiwan  experienced  a  hyperinflation  in  the  late  1940s
as a result  of the  expansive  monetary  policy  used  to finance  the  KMT's
military  efforts  on the  mainland.  Under  strong  pressure  from  the  United  States
and  rapidly  declining  reserves,  the  government  instituted  an innovative
18currency  and  financial  reform  that  raised  real  interest  rates  for  savers.
Drawing  a close  connection  between  the  hyperinflation  and  the  political
disaster  on the  mainland,  Taiwanese  monetary  authorities  have  been  vested  with
substantial  authority  and  committed  themselves  to gold  standard  rules  with a
fixed  exchange  rate.  The  head  of the  Central  Bank  has  usually  been  a person  of
high political  stature,  both  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  have  been  tightly
controlled  by technocrats,  and  the  scope  for  independent  organization  by
interest-groups  or parties  has  been,  until  recently,  severely  limited.
From the  outside,  Thailand  appears  to  provide  a sharp  contrast  to
Taiwan.  The  country  has  a long  history  of  coups  and  military  plots.  Urban
political  mobilization  increased  during  the  political  liberalization  of
1973-74,  and  in the  1980s,  and  the  party  system  has  always  been  quite
fragmented.  On closer  examination,  however,  these  differences  are  more
apparent  than  real.  Unions  ha'-e,  until  recently,  remained  politically  weak  and
parties  have  not divided  shar.  y in ideological  terms.  Even  during  democratic
interludes,  the  legislature  has  not  been  a significant  locus  of  economic
policy  initiatives.  All  of the  parties  maintained  their  links  to the  key
military  and  bureaucratic  factions  which  exercised  tight  control  over
macroeconomic  decision-making  and  along  with  monarchy  provided  the  political
system  with  a high  degree  of continuity.
Venezuela  and  Malaysia  are  important  cases,  since  they  demonstrate  that
similar  outcomes  are  possible  under  democratic  as  well as authoritarian
auspices. In  Venezuela,  oil  income  has  no doubt  played  an important  role  in
mitigating  social  conflict.  Nonetheless,  economic  decision-making  has  also
been insulated  from  popular  sector  pressures  by the  electoral  dominance  of two
nationally-organized,  vertically-integrated,  multi-class  parties,  the  Accion
19Democratica  (AD)  and  the  Comite  de  Organizacion  Politica  Electoral
Independiente  (COPEI).  De facto,  the  parties  have  established  a collaborative
relationship  and  limited  the  space  for  independent  popular  sector  or leftist
forces  to operate.  Labor's  relationship  with the  parties  has  been
institutionalized,  but  it  has  not translated  directly  into  influence  since
each  party  also  has  substantial  support  from  business  groups  and  competes  for
roughly  the  same  cross-class  constituency.
These  structures  have  not  wholly  immunized  Venezuela  against  either
inflation  or other  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The  alternation  of parties  in
office  has led  to important  policy  shifts. The  administration  of Carlos
Andres  Perez (1973-78)  initially  adopted  t  populist  stance.  This  was shortly
toned  down,  but the  government  did  initiate  a major  expansion  of public
employment  and investment  in the  state-owned  enterprise  sector,  exploiting
Venezuela's  status  as an oil  exporter  to borrow  heavily  on the  Euromarkets.
An overvalued  exchange  rate  dampened  pressure  on  prices  over  the  1970s.  By
1979,  however,  an increase  in inflation  and  perceptions  of economic
mismanagement  contributed  to a COPEI  victory  at the  polls,  followed  quickly  by
a stabilization  plan.
Precisely  because  of fears  of inflation,  the  COPEI  government  persisted
in  supporting  the  overvalued  bolivar;  this  only  encouraged  capital  flight  and
further  pressure  on the  currency.  Venezuela's  debt  crisis  broke  in February
1983.  The  core  of the  adjustment  program  was a large  devaluation,  coupled  with
the initiation  of a  multiple  exchange  rate  system  designed  to insulate  the
real  sector  from  the  effects  of speculative  capital  movements.  The  government
also  took  drastic  action,  however.  The  devaluation  and  fiscal  squeeze  no doubt
contributed  to COPEI's  electoral  defeat  later  that  year.  By  now,  however,  the
20rival  AD leaders  also  accepted  the importance  of reversing  inflationary
expectations  and  both  the  Lusinchi  (1984-1988)  and  the  Andres-Perez  (1988-
governments  launched  comprehensive  stabilization  plans  on coming  to office.
These  were seriously  complicatee  under  Lusinchi  by the  collapse  of oil
prices  and  under  Andres-Perez  by  widespread  riots  against  adjustment  measures
in 1989,  and  it remains  uncertain  whether  Venezuela  has finally  returned  to
its  low-inflation  equilibrium.  Nonetheless,  it is  clear  that  the  two-party
system  has  facilitated  the  imposition  of stabilization  programs  in  a
democratic  context.
Malaysia  also  demonstrates  the  importance  of institutional  arrangements
for  managing  group  conflicts,  though  the  salient  cleavages  are  different.
Prior  to  the  general  election  of 1969,  serious  violence  erupted  between  the
Chinese  and  Malay  communities.  Following  a  brief  suspension  of democratic
rule,  the  new government  of Tun  Razak  moved  to  construct  a "grand  coalition"
that  would  integrate  conservative  leaders  of the  Chinese  and  Indian
communities,  while  maintaining  and  institutionalizing  Malay  dominance  of the
political  system. Policies  designed  to assist  the  Malays  ('bumiputra'),
including  an expansion  of the  state-owned  enterprise  sector,  contributed  to
the  inflation  of the  early  1970s.  High  domestic  savings  rates  and  lucrative
trade  taxes  have  made it  possible  to finance  large  fiscal  deficits  in  a non-
inflationary  way,  however.  These  structural  features  of the  Malaysian  economy
have  contributed  to the  low-inflation  outcome.  But  the  political  insulaticn
and  conservative  orientation  of the  Malaysian  monetary  authorities,  a legacy
of the  British  currency  board,  has  no doubt  contributed.  This in  turn,  has
been reinforced  by the  ability  of the  Alliance  party  to shield  macroeconomic
policy  from  political  contention.
21Mixed  Recoids:  The  Moderate  Inflation  Countries
Countries  with  mixed  records  are  those  which  have  experienced  severe
episodes  of inflation  for  some  period  or recurrent  problems  of  moderate
inflation  over  a longer  time  period.  One striking  difference  between  this
group  and  the  low  inflation  countries  is the  shift  in the  relative  importance
of external  and  domestic  sources  of inflation.  Many of the  episodes  in the
moderate  inflation  countries  overlapped  with  the  two  oil  shocks,  and  Peru,
Mexico,  Turkey,  and  the  Philippines  faced  severe  budgetary  problems  as a
result  of the  withdrawal  of external  financing.  Yet  domescic  policy  stance
appears  to  have seriously  aggravated  the  effects  of external  shocks.
The  political  characteristics  of these  countries  differ  predictably
from  the  low  inflation  cases.  Governments  are  more  vulnerable  to electoral
constraints  and  more inclined  toward  developmentalist  or redistributive
orientations.  There  are  also  more  episodes  in  which  polarized  or fragmented
party  systems  have  eroded  the  insulation  of  decision-makers.  Nevertheless,  i:
is  noteworthy  that  no single  factor  was present  in  more than  half  of  the
inflation  episodes  delineated,  and  only rarely  did  any  two  of the  three
political  factors  operate  together  during  the  same  episode.
Although  distributive  politics  appears  to  play  a greater  role  in  these
cases  than  in the  low  inflation  countries,  it is  useful  to examine  how  these
pressures  operated  from  country  to  country. Three  subpatterns  can  be
distinguished.  In Indonesia,  Jamaica,  Turkey,  and  Peru,  independent,  well-
organized  political  groups  were temporarily  mobilized  in  settings  of party
polarization  and  governments  with strong  redistributive  orientations.  In  Korea
and  the  Philippines,  the  legitimacy  of incumbent  governmerts  has  periodically
22been  challenged,  but  opposition  forces  have  remained  weakly  organized  or
vulnerable  to repression.  Mexico,  Costa  Rica  and  Colombia  constitute
anomalies,  since  the  general  security  of officeholders,  their  relatively
conservative  political  orientation  and  the  party  system  seem  otherwise
conducive  to stable  macroeconomic  policy. The  effort  of incumbent  governments
to adjust  to  new  political  demands  has been  one  factor  undermining  stability,
yet  these  systems  also  show  surprising  institutional  capabilities  that
partially  vindicate  the  institutional  argument.
Indonesia,  Janmaica,  Turkey  and  Peru. The  Indonesian  inflation  is a
particularly  clear  case  of radicalization  and  polarization  of the  political
system  giving  rise  to  conflicting  demands  on the  government  and  the loss  of
bureaucratic  autonomy.  The  initiation  of "Guided  Democracy'  in 1959  reduced
the  influence  of western-oriented  elites  and  established  an  uneasy  troika
between  the  radical  national  st Sukarno,  the  Army,  and  the  Communist  Party.
The  proximate  cause  of the  inflation  was fiscal  deficits  financed  by unlimited
money  creation  by the  central  bank;  the  real  causes  reside  in  efforts  to
placate  the  demands  of  polarized  groups  in  a  weakly  institutionalized  system.
A grandiose  8 year  plan  announced  in 1961  contained  a variety  of expensive
projects  for  which  there  was little  available  money.  The  Planning  Council
degenerated  into  a  purely  political  entity.  The  entry  of the  army  into  the
government  resulted  in  parasitic  behavior  that  continued  to pose  challenges
into  the  1980s.  Technocrats  attempted  a stabilization  program  in 1963,  but  the
bureaucracy,  army,  Communists  and  Sukarno's  policy  of  military  'confrontasi'
with  Malaysia  derailed  the  program.  In 1965,  the  country  slipped  into
hyperinflation.
Stabilization  came  only  after  Suharto's  assumption  of power.  The
23island-wide  massacre  of the  PKI  leadership  and  cadre  by the  army  and  its
mobilized  Muslim  end  anti-Chinese  supporters  freed  Suharto  from  any  pressure
on  his left. Unions  and  business  groups  were  weak,  and  in any  case supported
some  easing  of prices,  as did  the  civil  service  and  export  interests  ravaged
by Suakarno's  inflationary  policies. The  turning  point  came  in 1966,  when
Suharto's  ear  was  captured  by a group  of  western-trained  economists  known
later  as the  Berkeley  mafia.  An interesting  feature  of the  stabilization  was
the  passage  of  a constitutional  provision  that  the  budget  be "balanced,"  in
the  sense  that  expenditures  could  not  exceed  revenues  plus  counterpart  funds
generated  by the  aid  program. This limited  the  crucial  mechanism  that  had
operated  before;  unlimited  central  bank  emissions.  Though  there  are  some
subsequent  pressures  on the  budget  from  the  large  state-owned  enterprise
sector,  Indonesia's  subsequent  bouts  with inflation  stem  largely  from  the
inflow  of foreign  assets  associated  with oil,  and  every  effort  is  made to
manage  them  quickly. After  1970,  Indonesia  resembles  the  authoritarian  low-
inflation  countries:  a stable,  single-party  government  with  a low  level  of
independent  group  mobilization  and  insulated  economic  bureaucracy.
In the  mid-1970s  inflationary  pressures  in  Jamaica,  Turkey,  and  Peru
could  also  be traced  to  polarized  social  conflicts  in  which  governments  with
strong  redistributive  objectives  played  a role.  In  this,  they  resembled  the
four  high inflation  countries,  with the  notable  difference  that  these
political  characteristics  were a departure  from  previous  history.  In  the
episodes  initiating  these  inflationary  cycles  in  the  early  1970s,  independent
popular-sector  groups  were relatively  weak and  the  priLmary  impetus  for
inflation  came  from  the  developmental  goals  of the  governments  themselves.
Over  the  course  of the  decade,  however,  growing  political  mobilization,
24polarization,  and  the redistributive  conflicts  spawned  by inflation  itself
made it increasingly  difficult  for  these  countries  to stabilize.
In  Jamaica,  Manley's  attempt  at a socialist  experiment  transformed  a
party  system  not  previously  marked  by sharp  ideological  cleavages  into  a
highly  polarized  one. Elections  became  the  opportunity  for  violent  clashes
among  partisans  who  were largely  outside  the  control  of political  elites. In
Peru,  popular  sector  groups  mobilized  from  above  by the  populist  military
Velasco  government  had  very little  autonomy  or independence.  By the  late
1970s,  however,  Velasco's  successors  had  to contend  not  only  with the
inflationary  legacy  of the  ambitious  redistributive  and  developmentalist
policies  of the  populist  phase  of  military  rule,  but  also  the increasingly
independent  and  left-oriented  political  movements  that  period  had  spawned.
Turkey  also  demonstrates  the  way institutional  structures  can  produce
perverse  incentives  and intensify  problems  of  collective  action.  In the  mid-
1970s,  an ambitious  program  of investment  in state-owned  enterprises  wAs
sustained  with foreign  borrowing  despite  the  first  oil  shock. Though  the
electorate  continued  to show  overwhelming  loyalty  to  the  two  major  parties,
extremist  political  forces  on both  the  left  and  the  right  placed  increasing
strains  on the  center.  In  a classic  case  of the  political  fragmentation  that
can  occur  under  proportional  representation,  governing  coalitions  proved
difficult  tc form,  and  were  hostage  to the  demands  of small  anti-system
parties.  In this  setting,  it  proved  extremely  difficult  to cut  government
expenditure  or adjust  to the  withdrawal  of foreign  lending. A  stabilization
program  was announced  under  democratic  auspices  in 1980,  but  the  government
was quickly  deadlocked  over  political  issues  and  was  ousted  by the  military  in
September  of that  year.
25Korea  and  the  Philippines.  In these  two  countries,  governments  were
more conservative  than  in Jamaica,  Turkey,  and  Peru,  and  popular  sector  groups
were less  well organized  and  subject  to outright  repression. In  both
countries,  however,  governments  have faced  recurrent  problems  of legitimation,
and  used  macroeconomic  policy  to  cope  with electoral  and  non-electoral
challenges.  While  relatively  low-inflation  countries,  the  strategic  use  of
macroeconomic  policy  and  politically-motivated  delays  in stabilization  help
explain  a pattern  of recurrent,  if  moderate,  inflation.
Korea  shows  evidence  of a political  business  cycle. Large  expansions  of
the  money  supply  coincide  with  the  election  of 1963  and  the  1969  referendum  on
a  constitutional  amendment  that  allowed  Park  Chung  Hee  to run  for  a third
term.  In  1973,  in response  to  protest  over  the  initiation  of the
authoritarian  Yushin  constitution,  Park  pursued  a  number  of policies  such  as
preferential  tax  breaks  for  the  working  class  that  were  designed  to reduce  the
likelihood  that  the  opposition  would  exploit  the  grievances  of labor  and  the
urban  poor. During  the  second  half  of the  decade,  the  government's  commitment
to industrial  deepening  led  to rapid  growth  of domestic  credit  and  external
debt  and  strong  pressure  on labor  markets.  The  inflationary  episode  of 1979  is
partially  attributable  to these  policies.  Unlike  most developing  countries,  a
commitment  to stabilization  emerged  prior  to the  second  oil  shock,  but it  was
not fully  implemented  due  to the  political  instability  both  before  and  after
the  assassination  of Park  in  October  1979.  Not  until  the  consolidation  of
power  under  Gen.  Chun  Doo  Hwan  were  consistent  stabilization  measures  adopted.
Notwithstanding  the  numerous  differences  between  Korea  and  the
Philippines,  there  are  also  some  interesting  similarities.  The  upsurge  of
26inflation  in 1971  was directly  linked  to  expansionary  policies  undertaken  in
support  of  Marcos'  unprecedented  bid  for  a second  term  as president.
Subsequent  episodes  of inflation  were  mainly  the  result  of the  oil  shocks,  but
as in  a number  of other  countries,  Marcos  borrowed  heavily  over  the  1970s  to
finance  an ambitious  expansion  of the  public  sector.  With  many  projects  tied
to cronies  of the  Marcoses,  the  government  proved  slow  in  adjusting  to the
adverse  trends  in its  terms  of trade.  The  surge  of inflation  in 1984  followed
the  loss  of confidence  on the  part  of  external  creditors  after  the
assassination  of Benigno  Aquino  in  1983  and  the  upsurge  of protest  that
followed. One reasons  for  the  rapid  expansion  of the  money  supply  in  early
1984  was  to deflect  attention  from  the  opposition  in  anticipation  of  a
critical  election  in  May 1984.
Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  and  Colombia. These  three  countries  would  appear  to
pose  a challenge  to  an institutionalist  explanation  of  macroeconomic  policy.
All experienced  serious  episodes  of inflation  during  the  1970s  and  1980s  in
spite  of the  fact  that,  as in  Venezuela,  multi-class  parties  have  dominated
the  electoral  arena  and  government  over  a long  period  of time. This feature
of the  political  system  did  place  strong  limits  on distributive  conflicts  in
all  three  countries,  and  enabled  governments  in the  1950s  and  1960s  to
maintain  considerable  price  stability.
In common  with  a number  of other  developing  countries,  however,  the
commodity  and  borrowing  booms  of the  1970s  allowed  strongly  developmentalist
administrations  to  promote  the  growth  of large  state-owned  enterprise  sectors
with extensive  links  to  powerful  import-substituting  business  interests;  this
was particularly  true  in  Mexico  and  Costa  Rica. Expanding  fiscal  commitments
left  these  economies  particularly  vulnerable  to sharp  declines  in  commodity
27prices  and  to thp  freeze  on commercial  bank  lending  of the  early  1980s. The
severity  of the inflation  in  Costa  Rica  can  be traced  almost  entirely  to this
factor.  The  conservative  but  deeply  divided  Carazo  administration  delayed  in
responding  to the  collapse  of coffee  prices  and  the  first  oil  price  shock.
Under  a new  government,  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  measures  were
rapidly  put in  place,  and  Costa  Rica resumed  its  previous  low-inflation
trajectory.
In  Mexico  and  Colombia,  however,  the  situation  was  complicated  by
political  challenges  from  increasingly  militant  popular-sector  groups
operating  outside  the  traditional  party  structure.  Colombia's  traditional  two-
party  system  resembles  Venezuela's  in its  cross-class  electoral  appeal,  and
has provided  the  basis  for  policy-makers  to  pursue  cautious  policies. In
1968,  constitutional  reforms  backed  by the  leaders  of the  two  dominant
parties,  the  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  virtually  eliminated  congressional
control  over fiscal  and  monetary  policy. In the  presidential  elections  of
1970,  however,  the  joint  candidate  of the  traditional  parties  was almost
defeated  by the  ex-dictator,  Gustavo  Rojas-Panilla,  who  campaigned  on  a
strongly  redistributionist  platform.  Organized  labor,  which  generally  operated
outside  the framework  of the  party  system,  became  more  militant. By the  mid-
1970s,  the  strong  boom in  coffee  exports  added  to the  problem  of  maintaining
price  stability,  as authorities  proved  unable  to sterilize  the  inflows  of
foreign  assets  or to resist  pressure  for  increased  expenditures.
Financial  authorities  managed  these  pressures  through  a  combination  of
concessions  and  cautious  macroeconomic  policy. On the  one  hand,  union  demands
were  deflected  through  an implicit  system  of  wage  and  salary  indexation.  On
the  other  hand,  the  government  relied  on  backing  from  influential  financial
28and  export  groups  within  both  parties  to sustain  high  real  interest  rates  and
to  allow  growers  to retain  much  of the  coffee  surplus. Exporters  also  gained
from  a crawling  peg  exchange  rate,  though  adjustments  were  not  always
adequately  fast.  In conjunction,  these  policies  allowed  Colombia  to  maintain  a
moderate,  but relatively  constant,  level  of inflation.
Until  the  early  1970s,  Mexico  fit  squarely  within  the  low-inflation
category. Under  Luis  Echeverria's  mildly  populist  administration  (1970-1976),
the  insulation  of key financial  technocrats  in  the  Central  Bank  and  Ministry
of Finance  eroded.  In the  face  of business  resistance,  the  government  proved
unable  to initiate  the  tax  reforms  required  to finance  ambitious  distributive
programs  and  industrialization  plans.  Attempts  to appease  the  conflicting
pressures  on government  coming  from  business  and labor  through  growth  had
inflationary  consequences  and  in  1976  forced  the  first  adjustment  of the
exchange  rate  since  1954.  The  oil  boom  of the  late-1970s  coincided  with a
liberalization  of  Mexican  politics,  including  the  formation  of  new  unions  and
polit4.cal  parties.  While  not  able  to  directly  influence  policy  or to challenge
the  PRI's  dominance,  the  ruling  party's  concerns  about  its  electoral  fortunes
contributed  to a  particularly  heavy  borrowing  against  oil  revenues  and  the
failure  to  make adjustments  in  fiscal  policy.  By the  time  the  more  orthodox  de
la  Madrid  administration  came  to office,  ballooning  service  costs  on
government  debt  made fiscal  deficits  difficult  to  control  and  tended  to
undermine  very  harsh  wage and  credit  policies.
Mexico's  inflation  during  the  1980s  was  much  higher  than  in  Colombia  and
Costa  Rica,  but  it  eventually  proved  more  manageable  than in  the  polarized
political  systems  of southern  South  America.  The  de la  Madrid  administration
deployed  the  control  mechanisms  of the  dominant  party  to implement  a
29substantial  change  in the  overall  direction  of  macroeconomic  policy  after
1982.  Although  there  is debate  over  the  consistency  with  which  the  government
maintained  fiscal  discipline,  non-interest  .xpenditures  were slashed  and
credit  remained  very  tight. Using  its  extensive  leverage  over  the  official
labor  organizations,  the  government  maintained  strict  control  over  nominal
wage increases  throughout  the  administration.  Overall  austerity  was relaxed
somewhat  in 1987  in  anticipation  of the  presidential  elections  of 1988,  but
when inflation  began  to accelerate  at the  beginning  of the  campaign,  the
government  responded  with a  new  austerity  package  that  combined  tough  fiscal
retrenchment  with  wage and  price  controls.  Despite  Mexico's  very  high
inflation,  its  efforts  at stabilization  since  1983  and  its  willingness  to
pursue  an orthodox  policy  line  toward  creditors  reflect  a continuing  ability
to absorb  costs  that  would  have  beer  extremely  difficult  in  other  national
settings.
The  High Inflation  Countries:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Uruguay
Table  2 suggests  that  Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay  and  Chile  prior  to the
mid-1970s  have  had inflation  histories  that  differ  quite  substantially  from
the  other  countries  in  the  sample. These  countries  show  both  high  average
inflation  rates  over  the  long-run  and  a  high  degree  of  volatility  in prices.
Among  them,  these  four  countries  account  for  twelve  of the  twenty-one  episodes
of high inflation  and  nine  of the  fourteen  very  high  inflation  episodes.
External  shocks  are  clearly  one  component  of the  story,  particularly  in
the  1980s.  The  oil shocks  contributed  to the  acceleration  of Brazilian
inflation  in the  mid-1970s  and  after  1981,  and  the  interruption  of external
lending  figured  significantly  in four  episodes:  Brazil  1981-87;  Argentina
1982-85  and  1987;  and  Uruguay  1983-86. The  swift  end  of  easy  access  to the
30Euromarkets  constituted  a  double  shock:  it  cut  off  a  major  source  of
government  financing;  and  effectively  forced  governments  to  assume
responsibility  not only for public debt but for private sector liabilities  as
well.  The sheer  size  and  speed  of the  required  adjustment  foreclosed  the
possibility of smooth adjustment through increased revenues and domestic
borrowing.  Governments  had little  choice  but  to resort  to seignorage
financing.18
The  need to  generate  substantial  current  account  surpluses  through  large
devaluations also contributed to inflation.  While all debtors faced this
problem,  it  was particularly  severe  where  the  government  attempted  to  use  the
exchange  rate  as a  nominal  anchor  through  the  policy  of a fixed  exchange  rate
or  pre-announced  devaluations.  These  policies  were  adopted  under  military
governments  in  Chile,  Argentina  and  Uruguay  as components  of ultra-
conservative  political  projects  designed  to permanently  reduce  the  influence
of leftist  and  labor  groups. 19 With liberalized  trade  and financial  flows
disciplining the domestic labor  market, an overvalued exchange rate, it  was
argued, could be used to bring down domestic prices and lower inflationary
expectations.  In all three cases, however, the exchange rate  became
increasingly  overvalued,  as  a result  of  expansionary  fiscal  policies  in
Argentina, as a result of the inability to contain wage pressures in Chile.
Over time, it became impossible for governments to prevent growing speculation
against the monetary authorities.  These experiments in conservative economics
ended by the early 1980s  with capital flight,  major external accounts crisis
and in Argentina, near hyper-inflation. 20
5hough external shocks  were important in contributing to the high
inflations of the 1980s, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile before Pinochet
31had  histories  of high  inflation  that  dated  to the  1950s.  Most  of the  inflation
episodes  in  these  countries  appear  unrelated  to external  shocks.  These  long-
standing  patterns  of inflation  do  have  political  correlates,  however,
generally  combining  two  or three  of the  political  mechanisms  we would  expect
to erode  stable  macroeconomic  management:  strong  labor  movements  linked  to
polarized  political  parties;  severe  tenure  insecurities;  and  a  propensity  for
governments  with strongly  redistributive  orientations.
The  most  persistent  feature  of these  countries  prior  to the  1980s  was
the  extent  to  which  well-organized  labor  movements  were linked  to  highly
polarized  political  parties.  In  Argentina,  Chile  and  Brazil,  in  contrast  to
the  other  Latin  American  countries  we have discussed,  anti-oligarchical
parties  of the  center  and  left  recurrently  sought  the  support  of urban  workers
and  small  manufacturers  by appeal  to  class  and  sectoral  interests. Uruguay  is
a partial  exception,  since  the  Colorado  and  Blanco  parties  traditionally
engaged  in  cross-class  appeals.  During  the inflationary  crises  of the  1960s
and  early  1970s,  however,  both  parties  had  become  internally  polarized  along
left-right  lines,  and  a third  political  coalition,  the  left  of center  Frente
Amplio  (Broad  Front)  had  gained  a strong  base  of support  in  Montevideo  and  in
the  labor  movement.  During  the  1980s,  it  might  be  noted,  the  reduction  of
party  polarization  in  both  Uruguay  and  Chile  coincided  with the  containment  of
inflationary  pressures,  although  it is still  unclear  how  long  this  will last.
Details  of the  struggles  within  these  countries  and  the  mechanisms
through  which  they  generated  inflation  differ  somewhat  from  case  to case.
Chile  under  Allende  provides  the  clearest  example  of  popular-sector
mobilization  by a leftist  party  resulting  in  deepening  social  and  political
polarization  and severe  macroeconomic  problems.  Brazil  experienced  a somewhat
32similar  episode  in  1964  under  Goulart.  In  Argentina.  the  independent  role  of
unions  was  highly  circumscribed  during  the  first  Peronist  regime.  Inflationary
impulses  came  from  the  government's  populist  political  and  economic  objectives
rather  than  from  independently  organized  labor. Inflationary  episodes  that
occurred  after  Peron's  ouster  in  1955,  however,  reflected  increasingly
polarized  class  and sectoral  conflict,  as  conservative  coalitions  of  military,
industrial  and  agrarian  elites  confronted  militant  unions  linked  to the
Peronist  opposition.
In both  Argentina  and  Uruguay,  where  the  principal  exports  were  also
wage goods,  inflationary  conflicts  between  popular-sector  groups  and  their
opponents  were frequently  triggered  by devaluations.  These  would  first  shift
the  internal  terms  of trade  toward  agro-export  groups  in  the  tradables  sector,
then  generate  strong  popular  sector  pressures  for  compensating  wage and  price
increases. Somewhat  similar  sectoral  pressures  on the  budget  were visible  in
Brazil  during  the inflationary  surges  of 1956,  1959,  and  1964.  Governments
that  had sought  to implement  fiscal  adjustments  to  counter  declines  in  coffee
prices  were caught  between  the  demands  of  the  growers,  the  demands  of
industrialists  for  price  supports  and  credit,  and  growing  wage demands  from  an
increasingly  radicalized  labor  movement.
Popular  sector  groups  have  generally  emerged  as losers  in such
struggles,  as temporary  gains  in  real  income  are  quickly  eroded  by inflation.
Nonetheless,  in  a polarized  political  setting  where  contending  forces
represent  sharply  contending  preferences,  labor  may face  few  good  choices.
For  groups  which  are  economically  weak and  vulnerable  to repression,
stabilization  also  implies  disproportionately  heavy  costs,  with few  assurances
of future  benefits. Thus,  in  the  types  of cycles  described  above,  the  most
33prudent  course  for  labor  is to  press  for  a defense  of real  wages  when
political  conditions  permit,  even if  it is  clear  that  inflation  will increase
and  that  real  gains  will be eroded  by the  counter-claims  of other,  more
powerful  groups. Such  situations  constitute  classic  prisoner's  dilemmas.
Moreover,  contrary  to the  so-called  "folk  theorem"  that  iterated  play  can
bring  cooperation  by lengthening  time  horizons,  iteration  may  only reinforce
the  reluctance  to  compromise.
Polarized  politics  and  a  mobilized  left  will affect  the  time  horizons  of
politicians  and  fiscal  policy  independently  of  electoral  constraints,  but
tenure  insecurities  have  also  been  particularly  intense  in the  high inflation
countries. In ten  of the  fourteen  very  high inflation  episodes,  for  example,
sharply  contested  elections  or  broader  challenges  to the  security  of tenure
constituted  major  constraints  on economic  decision-making.  In two  cases--
Argentina  in 1975-76  and  Brazil  1962-64--democratic  governments  faced  explicit
pressure  from  militaries,  and  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  in the  1980s,  new
democratic  governments  faced  difficult  problems  of  political  consolidation.
Chile  provides  the  clearest  case  of a  well-defined  electoral  cycle.  In
four  of the  Chilean  episodes  (1953-55;  1958-59;  1962-64,  and  1968-70),  surges
of inflation  at the  end  of a  presidential  term  could  be traced  to expansionary
programs  instituted  as  each  new  president  took  office. Since  these  programs
were launched  in recessionary  conditions,  there  would  initially  be some
success  in reigniting  growth  and  slowing  inflation.  By the  second  half  of
each  administration,  however,  the  expansion  would  begin  to strain  the  limits
of existing  capacity.  In  the  context  of upcoming  elections,  incumbent
governments  were unable  to resist  inflationary  demands  from  organized  labor
and  business  interests.  Each  president  would  thus  leave  office  in the  context
34of stagflation,  and the  cycle  would  begin  again  under  his successor.  Two  of
these  cycles  involved  explicitly  populist  governments,  and in  the  last  two
episodes,  the  party  system  became  increasingly  polarized  as  well,  with the
centrist  Radical  party  declining  in importance  and  the  left  and  right  poles
gaining  in  strength. In  Uruguay,  the  inflation  episodes  of 1968  and  1973  were
also  preceded  by large  increases  in  public  sector  wages  and  fiscal  deficits
implemented  by incumbent  governments  during  the  electoral  campaigns  of 1967
and 1971.
As we have already  seen  in  countries  with lower  inflation,  authoritarian
governments  have also  faced  political  pressures  that  have  affected  time
horizons,  including  elections  and  efforts  to  negotiate  and  control  transitions
to democratic  governance.  In the  face  of  mounting  protest,  authoritarian
regimes  pursued  expansionist  policies  or delayed  stabilizations  in  Brazil  in
the  late  1970s,  Uruguay  in  the  early  1980s,  and  in  Argentina  in  both  1971-73
and  1981-83. In  Uruguay  and  Argentina,  political  liberalization  undermined
the  ability  of the  government  to  use  exchange  rate  policy  as  a nominal  anchor.
As business  and  labor  increased  their  demands  for  a relaxation  of credit  and
wage policies,  the  exchange  rate  in  both  countries  became  increasingly
overvalued,  contributing  ultimately  to  both  countries'  economic  difficulties.
Finally,  although  the  military  gove:nments  of the  1970s  were  highly
conservative,  it should  not  be surprising  that  the  dynamics  of  polarized  party
conflict  described  above  have  intermittently  led  to  the  emergence  of strongly
redistributive  governments  that  have  used  macroeconomic  instruments  to
engineer  increases  in  the real  incomes  of urban  groups.  Notwithstanding
important  differences  in  their  long-term  goals,  the  major  examples  would
include  the  Peronist  governments  in  Argentina,  Goulart  and  Sarney  in Brazil,
35and  Ibanez  and  Allende  in  Chile.  The  Garcia  government,  elected  in  an
increasingly  polarized  context  in  Peru,  represents  an additional  example.
While  inflationary  episodes  have  occurred  in these  count-ies  under  all  types
of governments,  including  nominally  conservative  ones,  these  radical-
redistributive  governments  have  tended  to push  inflation  peaks  to  new  heights
withir.  their  respective  countries.
As Sachs  and  Dornbusch  and  Edwards  have argued,  there  is  a remarkable
similarity  in  the  economic  programs  initiated  by these  *populist
governments.21  The  objective  of increasing  the  real  income  to urban  groups  is
usually  coupled  with a wdevelopmentalist"  program  of structural  reform
designed  to relieve  productive  bottlenecks.  In its  radical-transformative
variant,  populism  aims  at  a  more  basic  redistribution  of assets  through  land
reform  or nationalization.
New  populist  governments  uniformly  reject  the  claim  that  deficit
financing  is inflationary,  arguing  that  the  mobilization  of unused  spare
capacity,  declining  costs,  and  price  controls  can  be used  both  to stimulate
growth  and  lower  inflation.  They  typically  combine  support  for  real  wage
increases  with rapid  monetary  and  fiscal  expansion  which,  under  a fixed
exchange  rate,  also  raises  urban  wages  and  'ndustrial  profits  at the  expense
of the  tradable  goods  sector.  During  the  initial  phases,  policy  makers  enjoy  a
honeymoon,  as their  prescriptions  appear  to  be vindicated.  Reserves  inherited
from  the  previous  government  provided  a crucial  cushion  for  meeting  import
demand.  Output,  real  wages  and  employment  all improve,  while  direct  controls
aL-  deployed  to  manage  inflationary  pressures.
Within  two  or three  years,  however,  domestic  demand  generates  a foreign
exchange  constraint,  and  the  deterioration  of  existing  reserves  places
36increasing  pressure  on the  exchange  rate. Devaluation  is initially  rejected,
both  because  of its  inflationary  and  distributional  consequences.  Controls  on
trade  and  capital  movements  proliferate,  the  budget  deficit  widens,  and
reserves  shrink. In  the  third  phase,  the  disparity  between  offi'ial  and  black
market  exchange  rates  and  general  lack  of  confidence  leads  to capital  flight
and large  devaluations.  Inflation  soars,  and  stabilization  finally  becomes  a
political  priority.
III.  How  Inflation:  End:  The  Political  Economy  of Stabilization
In the  previous  section,  we focused  on some  long-run  political
correlates  of inflation;  here  we turn  to the  circumstances  under  which
inflations  have  been  brought  under  control.  We are  concerned  with  three
outcomes:  the  timing  of stabilization  efforts  and  whether  adjustment  was
delayed;  the  nature  of  the stabilization  package,  particularly  the  mix  between
"orthodox'  and "heterodox"  adjustment  measures;  and  the  success  in sustaining
stabilization  efforts.
We are  particularly  interested  in  understanding  the  relative  capacity  of
authoritarian  and  democratic  governments  in  managing  inflation.  Is a
suppression  of distributive  conflicts  a  necessary  component  of "successful"
stabilization?  Our  working  hypothesis  is that  this  will  depend  on the  level  of
inflation  and  the  political  dynamics  that  underlie  it.  Higher  inflations
require  more  severe  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  in part  because  government
reputation  is  likely  to  have  been  eroded  and  inflationary  expectations  deeply
engrained.  We expect  that  democratic  governments  will  have greater  difficulty
stabilizing  higher  inflations,  particularly  where  polarized  political
struggles  have  contributed  to  price  instability  over  a number  of recurring
stop-go  cycles.
37To explore  these  issues,  we look  more  closely  at the  outcomes  of the
inflation  episodes  outlined  in  the  previous  section. Tables  3 through  5 array
these  episodes  in terms  of the  level  of inflation,  the  political  circumstances
at the  time  of the  episode,  the  type  of  political  regime  that  attempted
stabilization,  and  the  outcome. The  standard  of 'success"  is  whether
inflation  is  brought  below  the  inflation  threshold  for  each  level  of inflation
for  three  years. Thus,  moderate  inflations  are  successfully  stabilized  if  the
government  brings  inflation  below  15  percent  for  three  years  following  its
peak  level,  high inflations  if the  government  achieves  inflation  rates  below
30 percent  for  three  years,  and  very  high inflations  if  the  government  reduces
inflation  below  90  percent  for  three  years. Such  a standard  of success  is
quite  generous,  since  it sets  tolerant  standards  for  higher  inflations,  deals
only  with the  medium-term,  and  does  not incorporate  information  about  growth
rates  and  employment.
Though  tne  number  of cases  is  too  few  to  draw  firm  conclusions,  three
important  points  emerge  from  Tables  3, 4,  and 5.  First,  even  by these  quite
generous  definitions  of "success,"  inflations  were increasingly  difficult  to
contrul  as they  moved  toward  higher  levels. About  two-thirds  of the  moderate
inflations  were reduced  below  the  fifteen  p:rcent  threshold,  but  less  than
half  of the  high  and  very  high inflations  were brought  down  for  three  years.
The  second  point  is  that  type  of political  regime  has tended  to  make
more  of a difference  at higher  levels  of inflation.  At moderate  levels,
authoritarian  and  democratic  regimes  manage  successful  reductions  in inflation
with  about  the  same  frequency.  At high levels  of inflation,  however,  only
three  of the  ten  democratic  governments  were  able  to reduce  inflation  and
these  were at the  low  end  of the  hig.  inflation  range,  between  30  and 40
38percent. In the  very  high  inflation  category,  three  of seven  democratic
regimes  managed  to stabilize,  but these  were  at the  low  end  of the  very  high
inflation  range.  Moreover,  in two  of these  three  cases,  there  were significant
limitations  placed  on civil  liberties.
Finally,  Table  6  contrasts  the  performance  of those  political  systems
that  are  polarized  or fragmented  (coded  '3')  with  non-polarized  democratic  and
authoritarian  regimes. Only  about  40  perceat  of the  inflations  in  polarized
systems  were brought  down for  three  years,  as  compared  to 70  percent  of
inflations  in  political  systems  where  conflict  was  mediated  by catch-all
parties  or suppressed.  In these  non-polarized  situations,  democracies  did  as
well as authoritarian  regimes;  indeed,  democracies  actually  have  a lower
'.ilure  rate.  In  polarized  situations,  however,  10  of 14  authoritarian
regimes  achieved  some  success  while  among  the  14 constitutional  governments,
only four  managed  to lower  inflation  over  the  medium-run.  Again,  however,  in
these  four  cases,  nominally  democratic  governments  operated  under  significant
limits  imposed  by the  military  on the  range  of political  activity.
The  strong  association  between  high  levels  of  polarization  and  high
levels  of inflation  makes  it  difficult  to separate  their  effects. A closer
examination  of each  category  of inflation  provides  some  basis  for
understanding  the  political  dynamics  of inflation,  as  well  as the  timing  and
content  of stabilization  packages.
39Table  3
Political  Correlates of Stabilization:
Moderate  Inflation  Cases
Inflation reduced below 15  Inflation persists
percent for at least 3 years
Elect  Orient  Polar  Elect  Orient Polar
Democratic
Colombia 1966  1  2  2  Brazil 1952-56  1  4  3
Venezuela 1979-81  0  2  2  Jamaica 1973-75 0  4  3
Malaysia 1974  1  3  2  Turkey 1971-76  1  3  3
Thailand 1980  0  2  2
Authoritarian
Indonesia 1978-79  0  1  1  Phil. 1970-71  0  2  3
Korea 1963-64  1  1  1  1980  0  1  1
1970  1  1  1  Peru 1973-75  0  3  1
1974-75  0  1  1  Mexico 1974-77  1  3  2
1979-80  1  1  3
Taiwan 1960  0  1  1
1980  0  1  1
Thailand 1973-74  1  2  3
Peru 1965-68  0  3  3
(Key:  Elections: 1, national election for chief executive during the episode or  within
following year; 0, no election.
Government orientation during majority of the episode.  1. Conservative, anti-labor,  an
left government; 2. Centrist government or coalition including  both center-right and
center-left components; 3. social-democratic  or center-left government; 4. socialist  or
populist government.
Polarization: 1. Exclusive one-party systems; 2. Inclusive or corporatist one-party
systems or two-party systems  with broad, catch-all parties; 3. polarized or fragmented
party systems.
40Table 4
Political Correlates of Stabilization
High Inflation Episodes
Inflation reduced  below 30  Inflation persists
percent for at least 3 years
Elect  Orient  Polar  Elect  Orient Polar
Democratic
Colombia 1963  0  2  2  Brazil 1959  1  3  3
Costa Rica 1973-75  0  3  2  Chile 1953-55  0  4  3
Jamaica 1978-80  0  4  2  1958-39  1  4  3
1962-64  1  2  3
1968-69  1  3  3
Colombia 1973-82 0  3  2
Peru 1976-81  1  2  3
Uruguay 1959-60  0  1  2
Authoritarian
Argentina 1949-52  0  1  1  Argentina 1971-73/1  2  3
1962-67  1  2  3  Brazil 1974-79  0  2  1
Indonesia 1972-73  0  1  1  Uruguay 1983-86  1  1  1
Philippines 1973-74 0  1  1
1984  0  1  3
Taiwan 1973-74  0  1  1
(Key: see Table 3)
41Table 5
Political Correlates of Stabilization
Very High Inflations
[5;0r350'  Inflation reduced  below 90  Inflation persists
percent for at least 3 years
Elect  Orient  Polar  Eiect  Orient Polar
Democratic
Costa Rica 1981-83  1  3  2  Argentina 1982-5/1  1  3
Argentina 1958-59  1  2  3  1987  1  3  3
Uruguay 1964-68  1  1  3  Brazil 1981-87
Peru 1983-85  1  4  3
Authoritarian
Brazil 1962-64  0  4  3  Argentina 1975-77/0  3  3
Chile 1972-74  1  4  3  Uruguay 1972-75  1  1  3
Mexico 1983-87
Indonesia 1962-66  0  4  3
Turkey 1977-80  1  2  3
(Key:  See Table 3)
42Table 6
Polarization, Political Regimes, and Stabilization
Democratic  Authoritarian
Successful  Inflation  Successful  Inflation
Stabilization  Persists  Stabilization  Persists
Non-polarized
or suppressed
Colombia 1966  Colombia 1963  Argentina 1952  Brazil 1979
Colombia 1977  Uruguay 1959  Indonesia 1973  Mexico 1977
Costa Rica 1974  Indonesia 1978  Peru 1975
Costa Rica 1982  Korea 1970  Uruguay 1983
Venezuela 1980  Korea 1974  Philippines 1980




Argentina 1959  Argentina 1985  Argentina 1966  Argentina 1973
Uruguay 1968  Brazil 1956  Brazil 1964  Argentina 1977
Korea 1964  Chile 1955  Chile 1974  Uruguay 1973
Thailand 1973  Chile 1959  Indonesia 1966  Philippines 1971
Chile 1962  Peru 1968
Chile 1968  Korea 1980
Jamaica 1973  Philippines 1984
Peru 1981  Turkey 1980
Peru 1985
Turkey 1971
(Key: See text for definitions of successful stabilization  and persistent
inflation.  Episodes identified  by peak inflation year.)
43Stabilizing  Muderate  Inflations
We begin,  as  we did in  the  previous  section,  with an analysis  of the
moderate  inflation  episodes,  Arguably,  the  same  political  factors  that limited
inflationary  pressures  in the  first  place  also  allowed  for  a quick  return  to
price  stability.  Most of these  cases,  as  we have  seen,  were in  countries  where
broader  political  pressures  were  muted  in some  form  and  where  conservative
economic  decision-makers  enjoyed  substantial  autonomy.  Most  of the  successful
stabilizations  in  this  category  came  in  countries  that  had long-term  records
of low  or  controlled  inflation,  and in  which  governments  enjoyed  a  high  degree
of credibility.
It could  be countered  that "stabilization"  in  these  cases  was frequently
not required. Changes  in the  external  environment,  particularly  the
stabilization  of oil  prices,  was a  crucial  factor  in five  of the  episodes  in
which  inflation  fell  and  was sustained  at a lower  level.  This  was true  in
Korea  1973-74,  Malaysia  1974,  Taiwan  1980  and  Thailand  in  1973-74  and  1980;
these  constitute  nearly  half  of the "successful'  cases. In  most of these
successful  cases,  however,  both  democratic  and  authoritarian  governments  moved
quickly  to counter  external  disturbances  with orthodox  demand-management
responses,  although  usually  not  without  substantial  debate  over  the  degree  and
timing  of the  policy  adjustments  required. This  stands  in sharp  contrast  to
the  delayed  response  to  external  shocks  in  a  number  of the  higher  inflation
cases  where  more extensive  political  constraints  operated.
The  episodes  in  Korea  and  Venezuela  warrant  more  detailed  comment. Park
Chung  Hee,  because  he faced  greater  potential  threats  from  an  urban  political
opposition,  adopted  a more  heterodox  adjustment  strategy  than  the  other
44success  cases.  The  government  responded  aggressively  to the  oil  crisis  by
borrowing  heavily  to  maintain  investment  in  export  industries  and  a high  level
of growth.  This  gamble  paid  off  when growth  resumed  in  Korea's  major  export
markets.  Inflationary  pressures  were contained  by the  stabilization  of oil
prices,  price  controls,  and  a generally  conservative  fiscal  policy,  though  the
government's  aggressive  industrial  strategy  contributed  to  the  re-emergence  of
inflation  in 1978.
In  Venezuela,  by contrast,  orthodox  stabilization  measures  can  be
considered  "successful"  only  in  very  narrow  terms.  The  strong,  multi-class
parties  did  work to  discourage  challenges  to the  stabilization  program  imposed
in  the late  1970s,  and tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  contributed  to
bringing  inflation  down  in  the  early  1980s. This  came  at the  cost  of a severe
recession,  however,  as  well as sharp  cuts in  capital  expenditure  and
investment.  As in  many  other  Latin  American  countries,  the  government  also
maintained  an overvalued  currency,  which  left  it  extremely  vulnerable  to the
debt shock  and  forced  adjustments  of 1983.
Although  lower  levels  of inflation  were generally  easier  to  control  than
higher  ones,  stabilization  of 'moderate'  inflations  did frequently  pose
political  difficulties  for  governments.  Though  most  of the  governments  in
this  group  were able  to return  quickly  to  price  stability,  seven  governments
were  not  able  to do so:  Brazil  1952-56;  Turkey  1971-76;  the  Philippines  1970-
71  and 1980;  Jamaica  1973-4;  Peru  1973-5;  and  Mexico  1974-77.  As expected,
these  governments  faced  greater  tenure  or  electoral  insecurities,  political
polarization  or fragmentation  than  the  success  cases. Governments  in  all
three  of the  unsuccessful  democracies  confronted  party  systems  or political
movements  that  were dividing  along  distributional  lines,  as did  Peru  after
451975  and  the  Philippines  prior  to  martial  law  in  the  early  1970s.  Mexico
experienced  no basic  change  in  its  political  structure,  but  it did  begin  a
political  liberalization  that  made the  ruling  party  more sensitive  to
electoral  constraints.
As in  Korea,  governments  in  these  societies  responded  to balance  of
payments  problems  by seeking  increased  external  financing  and  stepping  up
investment  programs  to  counter  recession. In  at least  one  case--Brazil  in  the
mid-1950s--this  strategy  paid  off  in  high  growth  rates. Unlike  Korea,
however,  these  governments  could  not  count  on foreign  exchange  earnings  from  a
diversified  export  sector,  and  did  not  have the  political  capacity  to  control
fiscal  deficits. Both  problems  left  them  highly  vulnerable  to  more serious
inflationary  crises  in subsequent  years.
Stabilizing  High Inflations
As Table  4 shows,  the  success  in  taming  high inflations  is  more limited
than  efforts  to stabilize  moderate  ones.  Eight  of the  nineteen  episodes  (42
percent)  were followed  by a rapid  recurrence  of the  inflationary  cycle. Four
of these  occurred  in  Chile,  but  as  we have seen,  lcng-term  inflationary
problems  also  plagued  Argentina,  Uruguay,  and  Brazil. Popular-sector  groups
played  major  or supplementary  roles  in all  but  one  of these  eight  cases
(Uruguay,  1983-87).
Successful  efforts  to reduce  inflation  tended  to  occur  at the  lower  end
of the  30-90  percent  range,  and  in several  instances  was attributable  as  much
to changes  in the  external  environment  as adjustments  in  domestic  policy.  This
was the  case  in the  Philippines  (1973-74)  and  Costa  Rica (1973-75),  which
increased  their  borrowing  in response  to  the first  oil shock,  and  arguably  in
Jamaica  in the  early  1980s.  To contain  a  pressing  balance-of-payments  crisis,
46the  conservative  Seaga  government  avoided  conventional  stabilization,  relying
instead  on generous  foreign  assistance  and  an  overvalued  exchange  rate. By
1984,  however,  inflationary  pressures  had re-emerged.
Effective,  medium-term  stabilizations  were achieved  in  only  two  of the
eight  episodes  in  which  price  increases  peaked  at over  40 percent,  Indonesia
and  the  Philippines.  In Indonesia,  where  the  main cause  of the  inflation  had
been the  monetization  of oil  surpluses,  stabilization  came  under  unusual
conditions. Inflation  was brought  down  in  part  through  the  adoption  of  more
effective  techniques  of  monetary  management,  but  the  financial  difficulties  of
the  over-extended  state-owned  oil  enterprise,  Pertamina,  also  forced  the
government  to repay  a  portion  of its  external  debt,  effectively  sterilizing
the  growth  of foreign  assets.
External  constraints,  particularly  the  unavailability  of credit  in the
wake  of the  Aquino  assassination  and  strong  pressures  from  the  IMF  and  banks,
were important  in forcing  stabilization  on the  Philippines  in  mid-1984. Once
the  decision  to stabilize  was  made--and  it  was  delayed  in anticipation  of
elections  in  May--the  absence  of  a strong  labor  movement  or of indexation
contributed  to the  speed  with  which  prices  could  be brought  down.  The  program
hit extremely  hard  at urban  living  standards,  however,  and  the  Marcos
government  was overthrown  less  than  two  years  after  launching  the  program.
With a few  exceptions,  such  as  Korea's  supply-side  adjustment  strategy,
stabilization  in the  moderate  inflation  cases  generally  centered  on
traditional  instruments  of  demand  management:  fiscal,  monetary,  and  wage
policy.  Because  stabilizing  higher  levels  of inflation  entails  higher
political  and  economic  risks,  several  governments  turned  to comparatively
heterodox  means  of stabilizing  prices  in the  high inflation  episodes.  The
47stabilization  program  launched  by the  Ongania  government  in  Argentina
(1966-70)  is  noteworthy  in  this  regard,  since  it  departed  substantially  from
the  conventional  IMF  recipes  of the  time. Devaluation,  a reduction  of fiscal
deficits,  and  strict  wage controls  were instituted,  but  the  government  also
took  additional  measures  aimed  at  avoiding  the  recessionary  effects  that  had
accompanied  earlier  IMF  programs. A large  tax  on traditional  exports  allowed
the  Treasury,  rather  than  agro-exporters,  to  capture  the  gains  from  the
devaluation.  With fiscal  problems  eased  by increased  revenues,  the  government
was in  a position  to  maintain  a  moderate  flow  of credit  to the  private  sector
and to  engage  in a  mildly  expansionist  program  of public  construction  and
subsidies  to  manufactured  exports,  supplementing  these  measures  with controls
on some  key  prices.  Within  six  months,  inflation  had  been  reduced  to single
digits  and  growth  had resumed,  all  without  a  major  drop  in real  wages.  In
1969  and  1970,  however,  the  program  was  abandoned  in  the  face  of increasing
pressure  from  landowners,  small  ISI  firms,  and  Peronist-dominated  unions  that
had  been  excluded  from  political  po-;er  under  the  military.
A second  heterodox  alternative  is  to finesse  the  political  costs  of
stabilization  in the  short-run  by indexing  prices  and  wages.22 This  was the
route  chosen  by both  Colombia  and  Brazil  during  the  late  1960s.
Minidevaluations  were  pioneered  by the  Colombian  government  to  counter  the
tendency  toward  real  appreciation  that  had  contributed  to  payments
disequilibria  in earlier  years. The  minidevaluations  contributed  to  mounting
pressure  from  the  organized  labor  movement,  however.  In response  the  Colombian
government  established  an "implicit  system'  of  wage  and salary  indexation.  An
extensive  system  of indexing  allowed  the  Brazilian  military  regime  to
accomplish  roughly  similar  objectives  between  1968  and  the  mid-1970s.
48For  both  the  Brazilian  and  Colombian  governments,  indexing  appeared  to
reduce  the  distributional  conflicts  that  accompanied  increasing  inflation,  and
was thus  a tool for  depoliticizing  industrial  relations.  In both  cases,
however,  the  success  of this  strategy  ultimately  rested  on fiscal
conservatism,  which in  turn  was related  to the  underlying  political  context.
Brazil's  move to indexation  was  preceded  by a very  harsh  orthodox
stabilization  program  imposed  by the  military  from  1964-1967  that  involved  a
particularly  severe  compression  of real  wages. As the  Brazilian  military
regime  began  to relax  political  controls  during  the second  half  of the  1970s,
long-standing  distributional  pressures  resurfaced.  Government  concessions  and
its  own  developmentalist  objectives  were reflected  in  growing  fiscal  and
current  account  deficits  and  increasing  inflation.  Indexing  also  resulted  in
the  price  effects  of adverse  supply  shocks  being  transmitted  quickly
throughout  the  economy,  generating  inertial  spirals. Inflation  doubled  to
about  fifty  percent  in the  wake  of the  first  oil shock,  and  to  100  percent
after  the  second,  remaining  at that  level  between  1980  and  1983  in spite  of  an
exceptionally  tight  monetary  policy  imposed  by the  regime.
Stabilizing  Very  High Inflations
Stabilizing  very  high inflations  poses  a  number  of technical  problems
that  are  different  from  the  stabilization  of inflation  at lower  levels.  These
can  only  be outlined  briefly  here,  but  some  exposition  of these  problems  is
necessary  to  understand  the  particular  political  problems  at issue.23 First,
inertial  forces  are likely  to  operate  quite  independently  of government
intentions.  As inflation  increases,  indexation  becomes  more  pervasive.  Once
this  system  is in  place,  de-indexing  poses  classic  collective  action  dilemmas;
while  all  might  be better  off,  the  player  who is "deindexed'  first  risks
49substaatial  real  income  losses.
As financial  instruments  are  indexed,  government  debt  and  interest
payments  can  grow  at a rapid  rate  even  if fiscal  authorities  prefer
retrenchment.  Inflation,  lags  in  tax  collection  and  in the  adjustment  of  tax
brackets  can  all result  in  a  decline  in the  real  value  of tax  revenue.  This
helps  explain  the  rapid  increase  in  government  deficits  in  high inflation
settings.
Expectations  play  a critical  role  in this  inertial  process.  In setting
prices  and  wages,  firms  and  workers  will take  past  inflation  as  a baseline
prediction  of future  inflation.  This  reduces  the  scope  of adjustment  that  can
be achieved  by traditional  demand  restraint  measures  alone.  If  prices  are
increasing  at 200  percent  annually,  for  example,  and  firms  were able  to  hold
nominal  wage increases  to  180  percent,  this  would  represent  a  draconian  cut  in
real  wages,  but  would  only  have a  marginal  effect  on inflation. Similarly,
cutting  profit  margins  is  unlikely  to  have  much influence  on inflation.
These  particular  problems  of  high inflation  explain  why some  sort  of
heterodox  strategy  of inflation  management  involving  wage and  price  freezes  is
likely  to be  not only  politically  attractive,  but  economically  necessary. Yet
as the  failed  heterodox  experiments  in  Peru,  Argentina,  and  Brazil  have  made
clear,  heterodox  experiments  cannot  work unless  there  are  also  adjustments  in
the  monetary  and  fiscal  fundamentals.  This  is true  not  only  because  of the
economic  effects  of  continued  fiscal  and  monetary  expansion,  but  because  of
the  crucial  role  government  policy  will  have  on  expectations;  ir.credible
adjustment  programs  will  quickly  be  undermined  by forward-looking  economic
agents.
50It  needs  little  elaboration  to  see  that  these  "technical"  difficulties
pose  political  challenges  of the  first  order  and  that  the  very  high  inflations
are likely  to raise  the  question  of the  relationship  between  regime  type  and
stabilization. 24 The  past  record  is  not  very  comforting.  The  three
democratic  failures  have  all  come  in relatively  new  democracies:  Peru,
Argentina  and  Brazil.  For  these  governments,  all  of  which  inherited  high
inflation  from  their  military  predecessors,  heterodoxy  appeared  to have
political  as  well as  economic  advantages.  All three  experimentea  with
stabilization  packages  involving  wage-price  controls  and  currency  reforms,  but
all  proved  unable  to sustain  the  fiscal  and  monetary  control  required  to  make
the  heterodox  component  of the  stabilization  viable.  Under  Sarney  in  Brazil
and  Alan  Garcia  in  Peru,  wage and  price  controls  were components  of populist
programs,  and  deployed  as substitutes  for,  rather  than  complements  to,  more
orthodox  measures. Real  wages  were  allowed  to rise  substantially,  there  was
virtually  no effort  to limit  subsidies  or control  spending.  When  pressure  on
prices  ultimately  forced  the relaxation  of controls,  a  new spiral  of inflation
began. Brazil  experienced  three  such  cycles  between  ;985  and  1989.
The  Argentine  attempt  at  heterodoxy,  instituted  in  1985  under  much
tighter  foreign  exchange  conditions  and  a center-right  government,  placed
greater  emphasis  on maintaining  wage restraint  and  bringing  fiscal  deficits
under  control. These  efforts  weakened  over  the  next  several  years  in  the  face
of strong  electoral  challenges  from  the  Peronist  opposition,  strong  resistance
to tax  reform,  the  cortinuing  drain  of debt  servicing  on fiscal  resources,  and
more generally,  a  weakly  institutionalized  budget  process. Menem's  efforts  at
curbing  the  Argentine  hyperinflation  of  May and  June  1989  after  assuming
office  in July  appears  to  have followed  a similar  pattern.  Sweeping  programs
51were  weakened  by the  inability  to limit  fiscal  deficits.
Only in  three  instances  did  very  high  inflation  come  down  under  civilian
governments,  and  in two  c. these  three  cases,  Uruguay  in the  1960s,  and
Argentina  in 1959,  these  civilian  regimes  significantly  curtailed  civil
liberties. Significant  limitations  on civil  liberties  was  also  evident  in
another  "success'  story  not included  in  this  sample,  the  stabilization  of the
Bolivian  hyperinflation  in 1985,  when several  hundred  union  leaders  were
arrested  and  the  union  movement  virtually  destroyed.  This  leaves  the  case  of
Costa  Rica  as the  only  fully  democratic  r'gime  which  managed  to stabilize  a
very  high inflation,  and this  came  at the  low  end  of the  high-inflation  range.
There  are,  however,  important  variations  among  the 'successful"  high
inflation  stabilizations  in  the  degree  of political  continuity,  the  extent  of
political  repression  and  the  severity  with  which  costs  are  imposed  on the
organized  working  class. These  are  related  in  predictable  ways to  the  nature
of the  political  institutions  and  the  degree  of  polarization  and  social
conflict  which  accompAny  the  inflation  episode.
At one  extreme  are  stabilizations  that  remain  broadly  within  the
constitutional  framework. In Uruguay  in  1968,  the  death  of  moderate  president
Oscar  Gestido  lead  to the  succession  of conservative  vice-president  Jorge
Areco  who used  new constitutional  powers  to declare  a state  of seige  and
impose  an austerity  program. The  program  was  characterized  by a  wage freeze,
price  controls,  a fixed  exchange  rate,  and  very  tight  fiscal  and  monetary
policies.  Censorship  was instituted  and  attempts  made to repress  unions.
Prices  came  down,  but  confrontations  with increasingly  militant  labor  and  left
groups  continued,  and  the  stabilization  package  unravelled  during  the  sharply
contested  election  campaign  of 1971. The  Argentine  stabilization  of 1959  was
52more orthodox,  relying  on a large  devaluation  followed  by strict  wage controls
and  very  tight  monetary  policy. The  program  was instituted  after  the  military
had forced  Frondizi  to install  a finance  minister  of their  choosing,  and  was
sustained  because  the  Peronist  party  remained  illegal.
Mexico  also  exhibits  continuity  in its  basic  political  structure,  and
has  had . Istantial  success  in  reducing  inflation  in a context  which,  while
authoritarian,  has  not  been  harshly  repressive.  In 1988,  the  de la  Madrid
government  brokered  a 'Solidatity  Pact after  five  years  of reliance  on
traditional  demand-management  approaches.  The  pact,  negotiated  with  business
elites  and *officialw  unions,  provided  for  wage  and  price  controls  that  were
crucial  ingredients  in lowering  the  inflation  over  the  next two  years.  This
was  possible  because  official  unions  were  integrated  into  the  party  structure.
Mexico  is thus  the  one  very  high  inflation  case  in  which  the  government  was
able  to gain  voluntary  compliance  from  at least  some  portions  of the  working
class.  Nevertheless,  it is  also  the  case  that  the  pact  was accompanied  by the
continuation  of  very tight  wage  and  credit  policies  that  could  probably  not
have  been  sustained  under  more  open  and  competitive  political  conditions.
The  combination  of a  high  degree  of social  polarization  and  conflict
with high  levels  of inflation  has  been  an important  factor  in  authoritarian
installations  in  a number  of the  cases  in our  sample.  In these  cases,  the
tasks  of restructuring  politics  and the  economy  have  usually  been  closely
linked. Incoming  military  governments  have  sought  not  only to  control
inflation  and  restore  private  sector  confidence,  but  to  curtail  the  activities
of labor  and  the  left,  which  are  held  accountable  for  the  economic
deterioration.  Once  again,  however,  important  distinctions  can  be drawn  among
these  new  authoritarian  regimes  as  well.
53Far-reaching  changes  in  both  the  economy  and  polity  followed  the  coup in
Indonesia  (1965-66).  Unlike  the  Latin  American  cases,  however,  inflation  in
Indonesia  was less  directly  the  result  of the  competing  demands  of organized
social  groups,  and  thus  the  link  between  repression  and  economic  strategy  was
less  clear.  The  process  of reform  could  be effective  by changing  procedures
within  the  government  itself.  Following  the  advice  of a cadre  of economists
known  as the  Berkeley  mafia,  and  painfully  aware  of the  extreme  costs
associated  with  Sukarno's  inflationary  course,  Suharto  institutionalized  a
budget  process  that  provided  checks  on the  ability  of the  central  government
to  pursue  expansionist  fiscal  policies.  Though  these  constraints  were somewhat
relaxed  by the  oil  boom  of the  1970s,  the  government  has  nonetheless
maintained  a relatively  tight  fiscal  control.
Turkey  and  Brazil  typify  more  repressive  military  interventions,  though
with a difference  in  the  degree  of institutionalization  of  military  rule.  The
Turkish  military  stated  clearly  its  intention  to return  the  country  to
democratic  rule  when it intervened  in  1980;  moreover,  the  promise  was
generally  credible,  given  that  the  military  had intervened  briefly  in  Turkish
politics  before.  The  military's  main  objective  was to put  an  end  to the
escalating  social  violence  which  had  claimed  over 5000  lives  in  the  late
1970s.  This  program  included  an effective  ban  on union  activity  and  the  arrest
of thousands  of activists  from  both right-wing  and left-wing  groups,  with
well-documented  instances  of torture  and  other  human  rights  abuses.  Though  the
motive  for  these  actions  was as  much  political  as economic,  it fit  with the
government's  strong  commitment  to stabilization  and  structural  adjustment.  The
military  provided  the  political  space  for  a team  of technocrats  to  continue
the  reforms  that  had  been initiated  under  the  weak and  divided  coalition
54government of Suleiman Demirel.
While Turkey's adjustment program was launched under civilian auspices,
the Goulart government in Brazil appeared unable to formulate any coherent
economic policy. Brazil's  military intervention  also proved more
institutionalized.  Otherwise, the pattern in the two countries is remarkably
similar: a harsh stabilization introduced  immediately following the military's
intervention, followed by some relaxation  as the military sought to exit
politics.  It is interesting  to note that in both of these cases, inflationary
pressures resurfaced as the military liberalized  politics, in Turkey in 1983,
in Brazil, in a more extended process after 1975.
The most radical economic experiments came in Chile under Pinochet and
Argentina in the late-1970s, also the two cases in which both popular sector
mobilization and subsequent repression of labor  were the mcst intense.  In
these cases, militaries allied with neo-liberal technocrats not only to
stabilize, but to introduce  market-oriented reforms that went beyond those
launched in Brazil and Turkey.
The Argentine experiment collapsed under the combined weight of an
unsustainable exchange rate policy and the  military's adventurism.  This
leaves Chile as the only country with a long  history of high inflation that
was capable of achieving relative price stability in the 1980s, and this in
spite of significant fiscal burdens associated  with servicing the external
debt.  The question is whether the conservative demand-management  policies
pursued under the Pinochet government will be maintained under the new
democratic government or whether, as in Brazil and Turkey, the opening of the
political arena will place new distributive pressures on the government.  The
possibilities for  macroeconomic stability  are enhanced by several changes,
55both  political  and  economic,  that  took  place  under  military  rule. First,  the
substantial  liberalization  of trade,  deindustrialization,  and  the  weakening  of
the  union  movement  have seriously  reduced  the  organizational  base  of the  left.
Second,  perhaps  because  of the  economic  and  political  shock  of the  Allende
government  and its  aftermath,  there  is  a strong  consensus  among  the  leaders  of
the  major  parties  that  inflation  should  be kept  in  check. Finally,  there  have
been  important  institutional  changes  in  the  management  of economic  policy,
including  greater  independence  for  the  central  bank,  which  should  contribute
to  greater  stability.  Nonetheless,  the  capacity  of the  party  system  to
prevent  the  polarization  of distributive  politics  has  not  been tested.
These  patterns  naturally  raise  serious  questions  about  the  ability  of
new  democracies  in  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Peru  to cope  effectively  with  the
hyperfinflations  of the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  Does  Costa  Rica  provide
the  basis  for  optimism  concerning  democratic  stabilization  of very  high
inflations?  In 1982,  the  Social  Democrats  were returned  to power  with  a
strong  majority  in  both  the  popular  vote  and in  the  Assembly.  President  Monge
instituted  strict  foreign  exchange  controls,  but  coupled  them  with  very  tight
budget  policies  and  an appreciation  of the  exchange  rate  that  cut  inflation.
The  program  was supported  by the  IMF  from  late  1982  on and  by concessional
American  assistance  on a  very large  scale.  Inflation  came  down  more rapidly
than  IMF  targets.  The  case  seems  to suggest  that  democratic  stabilization  of
high inflations  is  possible  where  incoming  governments  exploit  electoral
honeymoons,  broad  public  disenchantment  with the  policies  of the  previous
regime,  and  substantial  external  support  to launch  comprehensive  programs.
Yet even  a  cursory  look  at this  case reveals  that  the  circumstances
surrounding  its  success  are  very  different  than  in  the  other  high inflation
56democracies. Costa  Rica  was  the  only  case  of  very  high inflation  in  a
democracy  where  party  politics  had  not  become  seriously  polarized.  Inflation
had  not  been  a long-term  phenomenon,  so  there  were fewer  problems  with
indexation  or the  credibility  of  government  policy. Finally,  the  country
received  external  assistance  that  was  much larger  relative  to  GNP  than
Argentina,  Brazil,  or Peru  could  expect  to enjoy.
We close  with  two  possible  sources  of hope  for  the  democracies
experiencing  very  high  inflation. The  first  is that  as inflation  accelerates,
public  opinion  may be  more receptive  to  very strong  measures,  regardless  of
their  distributive  implications.  This  is suggested  not  only  by the  strong
support  for  the  Monge  program,  but  also  by apparent  support  within  the  Chilean
public  for  Pinochet's  anti-inflationary  achievements.  Quite  harsh
stabilization  programs  announced  by both  Menem  and  Collor  also  enjoyed
substantial  honeymoons,  though  the  prospects  of success  in  these  two  cases
remain  very  uncertain.
Finally,  there  is  hope  that  as  electoral  competition  becomes
institutionalized  in  countries  like  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Peru,  it  will  extend
the  time  horizons  of both  political  elites  and  competing  distributive  groups.
In the  newer  democracies,  the  second  and  third  round  of elections  have  brought
governments  to  power  that  favored  relatively  conservative  economic  programs;
this  is  not simply  a function  of economic  circumstance,  but  of  political
learning.  As experiences  in  Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  and  Venezuela  suggest,
democratic  compromises  on stabilization  issues  might  well  be more  enduring
than  the 'solutions'  imposed--and  re-imposed--by  successive  authoritarian
governments,  only to  be undermined  by their  successors.
57Yet  as  we have  argued,  this  result  is  likely  to  hinge  on the
institutional  arrangements  for  managing  political  conflict. If  continued
economic  stagnation  contributes  to a  polarization  of  politics  in the  new
democracies,  the  prospects  for  democratic  adjustment  must  be considered  poor.
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Inflation Episodes
The inflation episodes are derived on the basis of the following criteria:
a. Years when inflation (CPI) for the whole year crossed the threshhold
and all following years that it stayed roughly constant with no evidence of
stabilization;
b. For the "high" and "very  high" inflation cases, all years prior to
the highest annual level of inflation that are marked by an increase in
inflation above the respective threshold;
c. Within the "very  high" inflation  category, episodes are
differentiated if inflation is reduced significantly,  but remains above the 90
percent threshold, and then increases again.
Country  Years  Inflation in  Peak inflation




Range:  15.7  - 29.5
Korea  1970  12.5  16.1 (1970)
Malaysia  1974  10.5  17.4 (1974)
Philippines  1979-80  7.3  18.2 (1980)
Indonesia  1978-79  6.7  18.2 (1978)
Taiwan  1960  10.6  18.4 (1960)
Taiwan  1980  9.8  19.0 (1980)
Peru  1965-68  9.1  19.0 (1968)
Colombia  1966  3.5  1.9.1  (1966)
Turkey  19;1-76  6.1  19.2 (1975)
Thailand  1980  9.9  19.7 (1980)
Philippines  1970-71  1.3  21.4 (1971)
Venezuela  1979-81  7.1  21.5 (1980)
Brazil  1952-56  10.8  21.8 (1956)
Peru  1973-75  7.2  23.6 (1975)
Colombia  1985-87  16.1  24.0 (1985)
Thailand  1973-74  4.9  24.3 (1974)
Korea  1974-75  3.2  25.3 (1975)
Jamaica  1973-75  5.0  27.2 (1974)
Jamaica  1984-85  11.6  27.8 (1984)
Venezuela  1987  11.5  28.1 (1987)
Korea  1979-80  14.5  28.7 (1980)
Mexico  1974-77  12.0  29.0 (1977)




Range 30.1 - 84.0
Costa Rica  1973-75  4.6  30.1 (1974)
Argentina  1962-67  14.0  31.7 (1966)
Colombia  1963  2.7  32.0 (1963)
Colombia  1973-82  13.1  33.1 (1977)
Chile  1968-70  18.8  33.0 (1970)
Chile  1958-59  17.3  33.3 (1959)
Chile  1967-70  17.0  34.9 (1970)
Philippines  1973-74  8.2  34.2 (1974)
Jamaica  1978-80  11.2  34.9 (1978)
Argentina  1949-52  13.0  38.1 (1952)
Uruguay  1959-60  6.0  39.5 (1959)
Indonesia  1972-73  4.4  40.6 (1973)
Chile  1962-64  9.6  45.3 (1963)
Taiwan  1974  8.2  47.5 (1974)
Philippines  1984  8.3  50.3 (1984)
Brazil  1959  17.3  51.9 (1959)
Brazil  1974-79  12.7  52.7 (1979)
Argentina  1971-73  13.6  61.2 (1973)
Peru  1976-81  23.6  75.4 (1981)
Uruguay  1983-86  19.0  76.4 (1986)




Range: 90.1  - 1044.8
Costa Rica  1981-83  18.1  90.1 (1982)
Brazil  1962-64  32.3  91.4 (1964)
Uruguay  1972-75  24.0  97.0 (1973)
Turkey  1977-80  17.4  110.2 (1980)
Argentina  1958-59  13.1  113.9 (1959)
Uruguay  1964-68  21.3  125.3 (1968)
Mexico  1983-87  27.9  131.8 (1987)
Pert.  1983-85  64.4  163.4 (1985)
Brazi'  1981-87  19.1  227.7 (1987)
Argentina  1987  145.2  229.7 (1987)
Argentina  1975-76  23.5  443.2 (1976)
Chile  1972-74  19.2  504.7 (1974)
Argentina  1982-85  104.5  672.1 (1985)
Indonesia  1962-66  30.7  1044.8 (1966)
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